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THOMPSON G. MARSH

NUMBER 3

-

By VANcE R. DrrrMAN,

A

DEDICATION

JR.*

T is entirely appropriate that this 50th anniversary symposium issue of the Denver Law Journal should be dedicated
to Professor Marsh.
Thompson George Marsh, known to his friends simply as
Tom, has been a member of the faculty of the University of
Denver College of Law ever since his graduation from the
school in 1927, with the exception of leaves of absence to
further his education and to serve his country during World
War II. Outside his profession, Tom holds a Master of Arts
degree from the University of Denver. Professionally, he has
earned a Master of Laws degree from Northwestern University,
and a Doctor of Laws degree from Yale University.
Tom has also been awarded the great honor of being chosen
as a University Lecturer. On the occasion of the delivery of the
lecture, he chose to present his very esoteric theory of legal
analysis which has baffled his colleagues over the years. Undoubtedly, his presentation was one of the most scholarly of
any of the lectures delivered by this select group of faculty so
honored by their colleagues.
Tom has never followed orthodox methods of teaching.
But the effectiveness of his system has been well established
in the professional careers of the multitude of lawyers who
have labored through his difficult courses in the field of property law. He has gained the respect of all his students, who
are awed by his incisive teaching methods.
Tom is certainly one of the recognized authorities in the
field of property law. His publications in the discipline are
broad and learned, and on some occasions, so daring as to challenge theories that were supposed to be well established. Some
of these have prompted what is, to the lawyer, a most satisfying result- a challenge by others who have disagreed with
him.
*

Professor of Law Emeritus,

University of Denver College of Law.
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In 1971, in recognition of his substantial contribution to the
teaching profession, Professor Marsh was awarded the honor of
an appointment to the Charles W. Delaney, Jr. Professorship
of Law. He is the first to hold this endowed chair. There
could be no more deserving member of the faculty for such an
eminent post.
As a member of the Colorado Bar, Professor Marsh could
have engaged in the lucrative practice of law in matters related to the complex problems of real property. He has chosen,
however, what is probably to him the more rewarding experience of imparting to aspiring young practitioners some part of
the tremendous reservoir of knowledge which is his. Tom has
continued to teach beyond the normal retirement age to the
great benefit of the College of Law. During his years of
scholarship and teaching, he has added to his life the great
talents of his charming wife, Susan, and their four brilliant
daughters, two of whom have chosen their father's profession
of law and are now successful practitioners. Those who know
Tom's talents hope that many future generations of law students may continue to profit from his dedicated teaching of the
mysteries of the "jealous mistress."

OPTIONS, ORPHANS OF THE LAW
By PHILIP G.

DUFFORD*

INTRODUCTION

H

ISTORICALLY, the real estate option agreement has been
an orphan passed back and forth by the established households of contract and real property law. Most present day
real estate sales are based, in the first instance, on option arrangements. Many of the sales involve great sums of money.
Despite the frequency and economic scope of such transactions,
however, option agreements and the rights of the parties involved therein are somewhat nebulous. The option contract is,
in the eyes of many, a "noncontract," and the enforceable
rights and duties it may or may not create often seem fragile
in the face of legal attack. Consider these comments about
option agreements which appear in Thompson on Real Property:
One who has a legal right but not a duty to buy land or other
property holds an option. . . . It is merely an agreement to hold
an offer to sell property open for a specified time. A "binding
option" for the purchase of land is a contract, but it is also an
offer, which, when accepted, will create another contract...
An option is not an actual or existing contract, but merely
a right reserved in subsisting agreement. It is a continuing
offer of a contract ....
The option is not a sale. It is not even
an agreement for a sale. At best, it is but a right of election in
the party securing the same to exercise a privilege, and only
when that privilege has been exercised by acceptance does it
become a contract to sell.'

Such statements are common and correct summaries of the
law applicable to option arrangements. They are, in most instances, reflective of general law on the subject and, more
specifically, of Colorado law.
In Colorado, decisions dealing with option arrangements
have flowed from the appellate level since 1880, and at this
point in time there are at least 50 cases within the Colorado
reports. Despite this sizeable body of law dealing with options,
those arrangements are often created and entered into with
comparatively little concern or legal forethought. It is the primary purpose of this article to accumulate the Colorado cases
*

Partner, Welborn, Dufford, Cook, Phipps & Brown, Denver, Colorado;
J.D., 1952, University of Colorado. Virtually all of the research for this
article was done by John A. Dates of Welborn, Dufford, Cook, Phipps &
Brown. Thus, credit for the article's accurate and comprehensive documentation belongs to him.
1 8A. G.

THOMPSON, THOMPSON

(emphasis added).

ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 4443

(repl. 1963)
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dealing with options and to highlight their impact as an aid
to the creation, exercise, and enforcement of these nebulous
agreements.
I. CREATING

THE OPTION

Because courts look upon options as unilateral contracts,
binding only the optionor until exercise of the option, they are
strictly construed against the optionee. 2 Moreover, the impact
of the option's terms is generally viewed as a question of law
which an appellate court may resolve without being bound
by findings and conclusions made at the trial level.3
These strictures, as well as common sense, demand that the
agreement should be clear and definitive in its terms. 4 Certainly parties, consideration, 5 property descriptions, term, 7 and
especially the manner in which the option may be exercised"
should be definitively set forth. The option must, of course, be
in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds, unless one prefers to
live his life the dangerous way and hopes to satisfy the statute
through proof of part performance.9
Payment of adequate consideration for the option is of
particular significance.10 Without the receipt of a good and
valuable consideration for his grant of an option, the optionor
has made only an offer to which there is no existing mutual
obligation on the part of the optionee. 1I This offer, therefore,
can be withdrawn by the optionor at any time before acceptance. The optionee's acceptance, however, is rigidly required to
12
be in strict accordance with the terms of the agreement.
Recital of consideration is not, by itself, enough to make the
2 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963); Rude v. Levy,

43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908); T.W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert
Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 (Colo. App. 1970- not selected for official
publication).
3 Boulder Co. v. Poor, 497 P.2d 1281 (Colo. App. 1972-not selected for
official publication). See also Meier v. Denver U.S. Nat'l Bank, 164
Colo. 25, 431 P.2d 1019 (1967).
4
Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 155 P.2d 161 (1944).
5 Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo. 302 (1880).
6 Hill v. Chambers, 136 Colo. 129, 314 P.2d 707 (1957).
7 Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960).
8 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 321, 390 P.2d 313, 318 (1964). This case
is interesting in that the omission as to the manner of exercise in the
agreement was cured by the optionee tendering the full purchase
price.
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1-8 to -9; Hill v. Chambers, 136 Colo. 129,
133, 314 P.2d 707, 709 (1957); Mestas v. Martini, 113 Colo. 108, 155 P.2d
161 (1944); Boyd v. McElroy, 105 Colo. 527, 100 P.2d 624 (1940).
10 Stanton v. Union Oil Co., 111 Colo. 414, 420, 142 P.2d 285, 288 (1943);
Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo. 302 (1880).
11 Gray v. Quiller, 144 Colo. 54, 355 P.2d 99 (1960).
12 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908), and Gordon v. Darnell, 5
Colo. 302 (1880), are the leading cases on this point in Colorado.
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13
option irrevocable.

The sanctity conferred by the payment of adequate consideration can be lost if the optionee has the right to compel
repayment of his consideration in the event he does not exercise the option. 4 However, the enforceability of the option is
not destroyed if, upon exercise of the option, the consideration
for the option is to become a credit against the purchase price. 15
An unconditional obligation to pay an option consideration
in installments may also satisfy the consideration requirement,
but this is treading dangerous ground.16
Whatever infirmities may exist as to the initial adequacy of
consideration, Colorado courts (unlike some) have consistently
held that once the optionee unequivocally accepts the offer of
sale and obligates himself to purchase the optioned property,
the initial failure of consideration is no longer significant. The
optionor cannot thereafter refuse to perform because of the
17
original lack of mutuality in the contract.
Creating the option arrangement also requires care to avoid
constructing either a firm purchase and sale contract or a
security arrangement. If the enforceability of the agreement
hinges upon the occurrence of an external condition rather than
upon the optionee's election, a conditional but otherwise mutually enforceable agreement-

8
not an option-is created.'

Where options are constructed so that the optionee enters
into possession and use of the property, usually under a lease
arrangement, and thereafter pays substantial amounts of money
in order to retain his interest in the property, the Colorado
Supreme Court has tended to view the agreement as a purchase
and sale contract. Since the doctrine of equitable conversion
applies in Colorado, finding such a contract means also finding
a security arrangement. 19 The seller who continues to hold
13 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908).
14See Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849
(1960); Stiles v. McClellan, 6 Colo. 89 (1881).
15 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963).
16 Helmericks v. Hotter, 30 Colo. App. 242, 492 P.2d 85 (1971).
17Frue v. Houghton, 6 Colo. 318 (1882), and Gordon v. Darnell, 5 Colo.
302 (1880), are the early cases on this point. Stanton v. Union Oil Co.,
111 Colo. 414, 142 P.2d 285 (1943), is a more recent case containing a
discussion as to when mutuality of obligation arises.
18 Tallman v. Smith, 112 Colo. 217, 148 P.2d 581 (1944). See also Gould
v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960); Rocky
Mountain Gold Mines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver & Tungsten, Inc., 104 Colo.
478, 93 P.2d 973 (1939); Stelson v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 165 P. 265
(1917); In re Gauthier, 493 P.2d 377 (Colo. App. 1972-not selected for
official publication).
19 Konecny v. von Gunten, 151 Colo. 376, 379 P.2d 158 (1963).
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legal title is viewed as retaining a security right in the property. The overall effect of such agreements, therefore, is that
the "optionor" holds a security interest and must proceed by
foreclosure if there is default by the "optionee.12 0 The practical
result of such a foreclosure requirement is that the optionee
need not forfeit all of his "consideration" for the agreement.
Similarily, where options to acquire title to property are given
for the essential purpose of guaranteeing the payment of money
by the "optionee," the Colorado courts view the overall trans21
action as a security arrangement.
Whether a resultant agreement is or is not an option, as
opposed to a contract of purchase and sale, can be of particular
interest to the realtors who might be involved in the transaction. Absent an agreement to the contrary, if the agreement
is an option, the realtor's commission is unearned and remains
22
unearned if the option is not exercised.
Considering the tendency of some purported option agreements to migrate into the purchase contract or security arrangement families and to make their presence felt within the homes
of brokerage or agency agreements, one has to speculate about
the true blood bond of the so-called "Receipt and Option Agreement" forms, commonly a part of modern real estate transactions. Although these forms vary considerably in their terms,
the one most commonly used is that which carries the written
endorsement of the Colorado Real Estate Commission. The current printing of this form is a hasty pudding type of instrument
with something in it for the prospective seller, buyer, and
realtor.
The agreement is constructed on a basis which normally
results in the prospective purchaser delivering a specified sum
as "earnest money" to the realtor who holds a "listing" for the
sale of given property. The owner of the property then has a
20

Compare Rocky Mountain Goldmines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver & Tungsten,
Inc., 104 Colo. 478, 93 P.2d 973 (1939), and Fairview Mining Corp. v.
American Mines & Smelting Co., 86 Colo. 77, 278 P. 800 (1929) with
Smith v. Schreiber, 93 Colo. 497, 27 P.2d 491 (1933), and Strauss v.
Boatright, 160 Colo. 581, 418 P.2d 878 (1966). In the latter case the
fact that rents paid during the optionee's possession were not applied
to the purchase price seems most persuasive in establishing the contract to be a true lease and option as opposed to a sale and security

arrangement.

Blackstock v. Robertson, 42 Colo. 472, 94 P. 336 (1908); Borcherdt v.
Favor, 16 Colo. App. 406, 66 P. 251 (1901).
22 Stelson v. Haigler, 63 Colo. 200, 165 P. 265 (1917).
In Rocky Mountain
Gold Mines, Inc. v. Gold, Silver & Tungsten, Inc., 104 Colo. 478, 93 P.2d
21

973 (1939), the fact that the realtor involved had received compensation was a factor in the court's conclusion that a sale contract, and not
an option, had been entered into by the parties.

OPTIONS
given period of time to accept the contract. This creates an
"option" in the owner-seller for such period of time for which
he, the possible seller, has given no consideration.2 3 If accepted
by the seller, the contract provides that time is of the essence,
and that, if the buyer fails to perform any condition as required,
the contract will be null and void and the seller will retain the
earnest money deposit as liquidated damages. The document
contains a firm obligation to buy on the part of the purchaser
if the seller exercises his "option," but there is a spectacular
omission of any firm covenant on the part of the seller to sell,
albeit there are covenants that he will execute a deed and
deliver possession.
From the face of these form documents, it would appear
that termination of the contract is the only remedy for default
for either the buyer or the seller. Such being the case, the
agreements would appear to create a hybrid type of option even
after execution by the seller, or, in effect, an option springing
from an option. That is, the parties still have alternative rights
either to consummate the contemplated purchase and sale, or to
forfeit or return the earnest money, as the case may be, and be
free of any further obligation. Clearly, it is arguable that the
buyer retains the choice of defaulting and forfeiting his deposit,
thereby nullifying the contract instead of performing.
However courts may have previously assessed such agreements, the door now seems to be closed fairly tightly against a
party's avoiding his obligation to convey (and possibly to buy)
once the other party has fully met or tendered his obligations.
The case of Coppom v. Humphreys2 4 embraced a situation where
the buyers had tendered their contractual obligations to a recalcitrant seller. With considerable force, the Colorado Supreme
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Groves, compelled the
seller to specifically perform in equity, thus planting a sense of
duty where none grew before.
There are persons who have so far outgrown their catechism as
to believe that their only duty is to themselves.

Samuel Johnson
II. EXERCISING THE OPTION
Of those Colorado cases which deal with option arrangements, the majority involve determining whether the conditions
of a given option have been properly satisfied or exercised,
thereby converting the option arrangement into a contract of
23
24

See text p. 284 supra.
171 Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970).
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purchase and sale which may be specifically enforced.
The basic rule in Colorado as elsewhere is that an optionee
must strictly meet the conditions of his option in order to
validly exercise the option and to maintain an action compelling
the optionor to perform. 25 Consequently, if the option agreement requires written notification of exercise, verbal notice
has been held legally insufficient. 26 Failure to render payment
or to timely meet any other condition is also fatal to the
optionee's rights. 27 If the agreement is silent as to when and
where an act must be performed, Colorado courts have sometimes implied a reasonable time and place for performance. 28
However, to omit a time certain for the exercise, or a definite
term for the existence of an option, may be to expose the
agreement to an assault under the rule against perpetuities.2 9
If an option agreement requires that payment of part or all of
the purchase price be made concurrent with the act of exercise,
notice alone of an intent to exercise, without payment, will
not satisfy the agreement.3 0 Neither will the existence of a
dispute as to the amount which should be paid relieve the
optionee from the duty to tender payment. 31
Conditions precedent to exercise and conditions concurrent
with exercise may be expressly or impliedly waived by the
optionor; and, if clearly waived, the optionee will be granted
specific performance against the optionor.32 Some of the Colorado cases show a surprising tendency to hold that acts on the
part of the optionor constitute a waiver or extension as to the
time limit placed upon the optionee's right of exercise, even in
the absence of new consideration by the optionee for what is,
in effect, an extension of his option period. 33 These cases, however, largely represent situations where the conduct of the
2

5 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908), and Gordon v. Darnell, 5

Colo. 302 (1880), are the leading cases on this point in Colorado.
26 T.W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480 P.2d 109 (Colo.
App. 1970- not selected for official publication).
27 Strauss v. Boatright, 160 Colo. 581, 418 P.2d 878 (1966).
28 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964); Tallman v. Smith,
112 Colo. 217, 148 P.2d 581 (1944); Boyd v. McElroy, 105 Colo. 527, 100
P.2d 624 (1940); Beckman v. Taylor, 80 Colo. 68, 49 P.2d 262 (1926).
29 Gould v. Rite-Way Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960).
30 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963); Howard v. Interstate Dev. Co., 29 Colo. App. 287, 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).
31 Miller v. Carmody, 152 Colo. 353, 384 P.2d 77 (1963).
32 Williams v. Gulick, 170 Colo. 347, 461 P.2d 211 (1969); Dreier v. Sherwood, 77 Colo. 539, 238 P. 38 (1925). See Coppom v. Humphreys, 171
Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970) (but, query, is an option really present
33

in this case?).
Phares v. Don Carlos, 71 Colo. 508, 208 P. 458 (1922); Wishered v.
Noonen, 71 Colo. 218, 205 P. 530 (1922); Poertner v. Razor, 500 P.2d 989
(Colo. App. 1972- not selected for official publication).
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optionor was such as to estop him from demanding strict adherence to the original time limit. The normal rule is that the
option period cannot be extended without additional valid consideration, and that an extension without such consideration
creates merely a revocable offer.3 4 Because of this rule, the
sound practice would be for an optionee to always pay a significant sum for an extension of his option period, despite the
equitable relief of a gratuitous extension which sometimes
appears in the Colorado cases.
Either by a deliberate act of the optionor or by other
causes, valid acts of exercise are often rendered impossible of
performance. Frequently, the difficulty stems from the fact
that the option agreement itself is simply not clear as to what
are the mechanics of exercise. In such ambiguous option situations, the courts have held that the optionee can protect his
rights under his agreement and be in a position to demand
specific performance if he manifests an unqualified determination to exercise his option.3 5 Similarly, if acts of the optionor
delay or obstruct the optionee in his attempts to validly exercise the option, the optionee can preserve his rights to specific
performance by clearly demonstrating an intent to be bound to
purchase the property involved.SB Should there be clear evidence that a tender or attempt to exercise would be a useless
act, and if that fact is known to the optionee, tender of exercise
may be excused. T Nonetheless, prudence would dictate that
even in such situations the optionee make a clear demonstration
that he has committed himself, without condition, to proceed
with the purchase. Unqualified tender -somewhere,
somehow
-is
the best way to demonstrate such determination; it cures,
as well, many of the infirmities that may have infected the
38
initial option agreement.
Acts done in part performance of, or in reliance on, the
contract of purchase and sale which would flow from an exercise of the option may also serve to constitute an exercise of
the option. This allows the optionee to seek specific performance, particularly where such acts were instigated, or
34 8A G. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 4444, at 264 (repl.
1963).
35 Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964); Abrahamson v.
Wilson, 131 Colo. 580, 284 P.2d 662 (1955); Howard v. Interstate Dev.
Co., 29 Colo. App. 287, 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).
36 Howard v. Interstate Dev. Co., 29 Colo. App. 287, 483 P.2d 1366 (1971).
37 Coppom v. Humphreys, 171 Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970); Ruark v.
Peterson, 30 Colo. App. 162, 491 P.2d 75 (1971).
38
Shull v. Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964).
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acquiesced in, by the optionor.39
The wise man knows that the very polestar of prudence lies
in steering by the wind.
Baltasan Gracian

III.

ENFORCING THE OPTION-

BREACHES AND REMEDIES

The most common act of breach of the option by the optionee, as indicated, is the failure to perform some act or con40
dition of the option by the time or in the manner required.
Where this occurs, the remedy of the optionor is generally to
declare the optionee's rights at an end, freeing the optionor of
any future duty to convey the property in question pursuant
to firm contract rights.4 This is generally all that is desired
by the optionor. If his title is under cloud from the option, the
court decree which runs against the optionee to void the option
will clear title. In any event, a recorded option will cease to
give constructive notice one year following the date specified
42
for conveyance.
Conversely, in the normal case of a defaulting optionor,
his default lies in his refusal to acknowledge that the option
was validly exercised and that the optionee is entitled to specific performance of the contract of purchase and sale which
arises after exercise. In such situations, the remedy for breach
generally sought by the optionee is specific performance
of that contract. 43 A peculiar situation sometimes arises when
the optionee has cause to believe his optionor cannot or will not
ultimately perform specifically if he, the optionee, should
exercise the option. At least in one such situation, a declaratory judgment was successfully sought to test the air around
the option. 44 The caveat here, however, is that the courts have
often refused to evaluate a party's ability to perform until and
unless the time for such performance arrives.4 5 Patience, then,
may be the only answer in such situations.
Adopt the pace of nature; her secret is patience.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
CONCLUSION

Despite the clarity with which most Colorado cases speak
to each specific question the option agreement presents, the
3, Coppom v. Humphreys, 171 Colo. 410, 467 P.2d 816 (1970); Shull v.

Sexton, 154 Colo. 311, 390 P.2d 313 (1964); Hill v. Chambers, 136 Colo.
129, 314 P.2d 707 (1957); Byers v. Denver Circle R.R., 13 Colo. 552, 22
P. 951 (1889).
40 See text p. 288 supra.
41 Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482, 96 P. 560 (1908).
42
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-6-11 (1963).
43 Beckman v. Taylor, 80 Colo. 68, 249 P. 262 (1926).
44 Wysowatcky v. Francis, 483 P.2d 1353 (Colo. App. 1971).
45 Abrahamson v. Wilson, 131 Colo. 580, 284 P.2d 662 (1955).
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decisions do not either fully adopt or fully reject the option
as a defined and blooded member of the contract family. That
being the situation, one has to wonder why usage of the option
arrangement persists and grows. Probably, it is because dealmaking circumstances often need the latitude options offer,
and because the law in its grace (and it is a graceful science)
recognizes that need.
When used, the option indicates that the prospective seller
half does and half does not wish to sell, and that the prospective buyer is similarly uncertain or undetermined. Otherwise,
either or both would insist upon a firm contract of purchase
and sale. Obviously, for those who like certainty in their lives,
the firm contract route is the preferred path. Prospective sellers and buyers usually fare better when they make their contractual commitments at that point and upon those terms on
which their minds have fully met. There may be unhappy
moments for all concerned before they bite the bullet and
close the sale, but there is a certainty about it that, in the
overall, lightens everyone's load.
It is seldom very hard to do one's duty when one knows what
it is, but it is often exceedingly difficult to find this out.
Samuel Butler

REPORT TO GOVERNOR JOHN A. LOVE ON
CERTAIN COLORADO WATER LAW PROBLEMS'
By

JOHN UNDEM CARLSON**

In a semi-arid state like Colorado, the importance of water
and the uses to which it is put loom large. As this resource
approaches full utilization, concern that social and environmental values be protected becomes paramount. The resolution
of these concerns is complicated by a system of water law
rooted in the state constitution. The potentialities for and the
difficulties of solution of the resource management problem
within Colorado's water law system are highlighted in this
article which should provide an impetus toward solution of
the problems surrounding this most necessary and somewhat
unpredictable resource. Originally a report prepared for Governor John A. Love, this article examines the water law of
Colorado as it presently exists, and analyzes this body of law in
relation to the state's interest in social and environmental uses.
The footnote format has been changed to conform to the Uniform System of Citation, and there have been minor organizational changes in order to conform to Law Journal format;
otherwise, the text as within sections is substantially as it appears in the original report.
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INTRODUCTION

T

HE doctrine of prior appropriation was law in Colorado
before statehood and adoption of the constitution in 1876,1
which, in article XVI, sections 5 and 6, recognized and confirmed prior appropriation as the fundamental water law of the
state. 2 The origin of this system of water law lies in the obvious
scarcity of water in the arid West, the belief that natural resources (water, land, minerals) should be placed in private hands
to foster growth and development, and the desire to allocate the
scarce resources among the builders of the state with sufficient
definiteness so that economic investments would be based on a
stable footing. The allocation of water in an appropriation doctrine state rests on the fundamental notion of "first in time, first
in right"; that is to say, the first person to use water acquires
the right to its future use as against later users.
This kind of allocation of resources is not peculiar to water;
in the 19th century the public domain of the United States
was opened to the populace on very much the same basis. The
first person to locate a mining claim could, by performance
of certain acts of development of the mineral resources, obtain
good title to the claim. 3 The first settler to locate on a home* This article is based on a report prepared for Governor John A. Love by

the firm of Holland & Hart. It is printed here with permission of the

Governor.
Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1962, University of
Montana; B.A., 1964, Oxford University; LL.B., 1967, Yale University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of James E.
Hegarty, Frank H. Morison, Jack L. Smith, and Jeanette P. Meier in
the preparation of this article.
1 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).

** Partner,

2

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5-7 provide:
Section 5. Water of streams public property. The water
of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within
the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property of
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stead site could, by performance of certain acts of development of the virgin prairie, obtain good title to the lands.4 The
settlement and development of the West were promoted by
these policies.
In the early development of prior appropriation law, it was
clear that a judicial decree did not create the water right; the
right was created by diversion of water and application to
beneficial use. The judicial decree was merely evidence of its
place within the priority system. Failure to participate in
adjudication proceedings rendered the right junior to those who
sought decrees. 5 This recording system for priorities has been
held not to affect those water rights perfected prior to the
adoption of statutory adjudication procedure.6
Determinations of water rights in Colorado were purely
judicial matters until the passage of the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (hereafter referred to
as the "1969 Act") .7 The 1969 Act added some element of an
administrative law approach to determinations of water rights,
in that most water matters may now be heard initially by
"referees." It remains true, however, that Colorado continues to
employ a judicially oriented and judicially derived water law
rather than an administrative water law. In this respect Colorado has rejected the administrative permit system long ago
the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people
of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided.
Section 6. Diverting unappropriatedwater -priority preferred uses. The right to divert the unappropriated waters of
any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the
waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service
of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those
claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for
agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using
the same for manufacturing purposes.
Section 7. Right-of-way for ditches, flumes. All persons
and corporations shall have the right-of-way across public,
private and corporate lands for the construction of ditches,
canals and flumes for the purpose of conveying water for
domestic purposes, for the irrigation cf agricultural lands, and
for mining and manufacturing purposes, and for drainage,
upon payment of just compensation.
3 30 U.S.C. §§ 22 et seq. (1970).
4 Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-39; Homestead Act, ch. 75,

12 Stat. 392.

Hardesty Reservoir, Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet &
Irrigated Land Co., 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929). This result was
codified in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-22 (Supp. 1971).
6 Larimer & Weld Reservoir Co. v. Fort Collins Milling & Elevator Co., 60
Colo. 241, 152 P. 1160 (1915).
7 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-1 et seq. (Supp. 1969, as amended, Supp.
5

1971).
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adopted in the other appropriation states.
Colorado is fast reaching the point where there is little
"unappropriated" water left. The lawful demands of all decreed
rights plus the demands of conditionally decreed rights and
applications for conditional rights may be sufficent to consume
the available water in the stateft If this assumption about available water is correct, the legal procedures by which a new water
right is created are less significant for the future of Colorado
than are the legal procedures by which existing water rights are
changed or transferred, and by which existing conditional decrees are made absolute.
As a general principle, the owner of a water right is free
to change the place or nature of use thereof, subject only to the
condition that the change will not "injuriously affect the owner
of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right
or a decreed conditional water right."9 We foresee an increasing volume of change of water right applications, for the economic value of a good water supply for municipal, industrial,
or real estate development purposes is greater, in purely dollar
terms, than the value of decreed water in the hands of irrigators, mutual ditch companies, and the like.
The Review Draft of the National Water Commission 0
adopts the thesis advanced by Dean Frank Treleasell and Professor Charles Meyers 1 2 that the legal system should freely
expedite market transfers of water rights, including transfers
from irrigation uses to municipal uses. Dean Trelease and Professor Meyers subscribe to the view that economic forces work
wisely in taking lands from agricultural production and applying water gained thereby to "higher uses" such as providing
municipal supplies. This belief that the market place makes
the best choice is illustrated by Dean Trelease's view that:
Economic efficiency requires that water be transferred from
less productive users to more productive users, from less valuable uses to mcre valuable uses .... Where property rights in a
resource are recognized, and sales of such rights by their owners
are permitted, the market (or price) system will automatically
13
allocate a resource to its highest-valued use.
8 Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613,

petition for rehearing denied, 295 U.S. 768 (1935).
9 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(3)

(Supp. 1969).

7-76 to -98 (Review Draft, Nov. 1972) [hereinafter cited as NWC].
11 Trelease & Lee, Priority and Progress-Case
Studies in the Transfer of
Water Rights, 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1966).
12 C. MEYERS, MARKET TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS (National Water Commission Legal Study, 1972).
10 PROPOSED REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION
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Meyers (and to an important extent the Review Draft of
the National Water Commission adopts a similar position) feels
that to resort to non-market criteria in allocating water
resources by restraining transfers is unwise:
Two criticisms [of non-market allocations] are fundamental. The
first is that when criteria of allocation other than willingness
to pay are used, it is very difficult to decide which uses (or
users) of a resource would be most productive. To answer administratively such questions as whether a piece of land would
be more valuable as a site of an apartment building or of a
shopping center is extraordinarily expensive and time consuming. In contrast, the price system produces an unambiguous and
usually quite satisfactory answer. The party in whose hands
the property will be most productive is the party who values
it most highly and is accordingly willing to pay the most for
it. ..
The second fundamental criticism of administrative allocation
is that it expands the role of government in society ....

One of

the principal attractions of the market is that it involves a minimum of governmental participation -ordinarily, a little beyond
the provisions of a judicial system
14
property rights.

. . .

to decide disputes over

Thus Professor Meyers urges state legislation making transfers
of water rights from one use to another, from one place to
another, easier.
We doubt that Meyers' faith in the efficacy of the market
is so widely held in Colorado, or for that matter in the United
States, as it was in the heyday of laissez faire in the late 19th
Century. Certainly there are many responsible citizens who
deplore the market's choices in the land development area in
the past 10 years. And there seems to be a growing sentiment
that administrative determinations, while expensive, are a desirable part of any future dispositions of scarce resources such
as land, minerals, and water.
Whether the State of Colorado chooses to give the market
free rein in disposition of natural resources or chooses to
attempt regulation of market transfers, changes in use, etc., is
obviously a political, not a legal, question.
This study does not attempt to deal with the merits of
the market economy's choices in redistributing water resources
in Colorado. Rather, it assumes that the role of government in
redistribution of water resources will increase. Accordingly, this
study will analyze the principles of Colorado water law as they
exist today in light of a heightened state interest in use and dis13 Id. at 3-4.
14Id. at 5.
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position of water rights, and will examine what legal restraints
exist which may limit assertion of that greater state interest.
I.

ELEMENTS OF APPROPRIATION AND THE NATURE

OF THE RIGHT CREATED

The constitution of Colorado in 1876 recognized and
adopted the doctrine of priority of right to water by priority of
appropriation. 15 The adoption of this system of water law was,
to an important degree, a confirmation of a pre-existing body
of law. The determination of what elements of the law of prior
appropriation are constitutionally ordained is necessary before
one can determine what is permissible by way of legislative
alteration of our water law.
The constitution contains these key elements of the doctrine
of prior appropriation:
1. All waters of natural streams are property of the
public and dedicated to the use of the people, subject to
appropriation.
2. An appropriation is the right to divert the unclaimed waters of natural streams, and the right to do so is
never to be denied.
3. In allocating waters to rival appropriators, priority
in time gives the better right.
4. Domestic users are to be "preferred" over agricultural users, and agricultural users are "perferred" over
manufacturing users. (This preference has been construed
to mean that a preferred user has the right to condemn
the vested water rights of others.)
These elements are obviously not self-explanatory. The
judicial and legislative processes have given meaning to them
in a manner very much like the evolution of English common
law. The principles of our water laws are not always traceable
to any explicit constitutional principles; however, variation
from what now exists has to be tested against the constitutional elements identified above. With this foreword, we proceed to an overview of the existing water law, from which one
may then attempt to determine the restrictions on any change
in our water law.
A.

Elements of a Water Right

Acquisition of a water right, as opposed to a court decree
for a water right, does not depend upon compliance with a
15 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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statutory procedure such as is required in "permit" states.10 In
theory, a Colorado water right is acquired by performing the
physical acts which constitute the appropriation, namely diverting water and applying it to a beneficial use.
It was early apparent that proof of priority of diversion
and beneficial use should be recorded in proceedings whereby
the respective priorities of rival appropriators could be finally
determined. But to require an appropriator to obtain a decree
posed a conceptual problem to the framers of our water law.
If actual appropriation depended on diversion and beneficial use,
then it was thought that the right so acquired could not be
destroyed by failure to resort to court proceedings. This problem was eventually glossed over by providing that the priorities
awarded in different adjudication proceedings should take
precedence according to date of adjudication. A failure to
appear and adjudicate one's right rendered the right junior to
those who did appear.' 7 The nonappearing appropriator suffered a subordination of priority, but his right still existed as
a junior right to those adjudicated.
The litigation associated with adjudication of water rights
has caused the terms "appropriation," "diversion," and "beneficial use" to become terms of art. An appropriation consists
of a diversion and a beneficial use of the water. Without the
presence of both elements, there is no perfected appropriation.
This definition seems to have been derived from that body of
prior appropriation law which predated the constitution. The
constitution, in article XVI, section 6, states that the "right to
divert" waters for "beneficial uses shall be never be denied";
this language is the sole constitutional source for elements of
an appropriation.
The 1969 Act gives this definition of an appropriation:
"Appropriation" means the diversion of a certain portion of the
waters of the state and the application of the same to a beneficial
use. 1 8

What constitutes a diversion has caused the courts some difficulty. Some early decrees made provision for stock watering
out of flowing streams, with no requirement that the water be
mechanically diverted from the stream. 9 The thirst of the
animals gave rise to the diversion. Also, natural overflows in
16 Cresson Consol. Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. Whitten, 139 Colo. 273,
338 P.2d 278 (1959).
17 Hardesty Reservoir, Canal & Land Co. v. Arkansas Valley Sugar Beet
& Irrigated Land Co., 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929).
1
8COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(6) (Supp. 1969).
19 Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
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times of high water - a right to be flooded - have been recognized.A In Town of Genoa v. Westfall,2' the supreme court held
that "[t] he only indispensable requirements are that the appropriator intends to use the waters for a beneficial purpose
and actually applies them to that use."2 2 Unfortunately, this
liberal test was not followed in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky Mountain Power Co. 23 There the
court held that maintaining a flow of water in a natural stream
for sustenance of fish life could not be an appropriation because
it did not entail a physical diversion from the stream. This
decision has been the principal impediment to protection of
wild or scenic rivers from full appropriation in their upper
reaches. The necessity of a mechanical impact on the flow of
water to constitute a diversion was codified by the 1969 Act:
"Diversion" or "divert" means removing water from its natural
course cr location, or controlling water in its natural course or
location, by means of a ditch, canal, flume, reservoir, bypass,
pipeline, conduit, well, pump, or other structure or device. 24

Beneficial use has not been so firmly and apparently irretrievably defined. The supreme court has stated: "The term
'beneficial use' is not defined in the constitution. What is beneficial use, after all, is a question of fact and depends upon the
circumstances in each case."125 The constitution specifically
identifies four beneficial uses: domestic, agricultural, manufacturing, and mining.2 6 The case law has considered other uses
as beneficial, including diversion of water for propagation of
fish,2 T watering grass in a city park, 28 "municipal" uses,'2) generating power, 30 and milling. 3' The 1969 Act adopts a very
general definition of beneficial use:
(7) "Beneficial use" is the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices
to accomplish without waste the purpose for which the diversion
is lawfully made and without limiting the generality of the fore2) United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 449 F.2d 1
(10th Cir. 1971); Town of Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370
(1960).
21 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960).
22 Id. at 547, 349 P.2d at 378.
23 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
24 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(5)
(Supp. 1969).
25 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842
26

(1939).
COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 6, 7.

27 Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933).

City & County of Denver v. Brown, 56 Colo. 216, 138 P. 44 (1914).
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
:11Sternberger v. Seaton Mining Co., 45 Colo. 401, 102 P. 168 (1909).
31 City of Telluride v. Blair, 33 Colo. 353, 80 P. 1053 (1905).
28

29
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going, shall include the impoundment of water for recreational
32
purposes, including fishery or wildlife.

In applying what it thought to be Colorado law, a federal
court held that the scenic value of a waterfall was not a
beneficial use for which a claimant could acquire a water
right. 3 As a result another appropriator was entitled to deplete
the stream before it reached the waterfall.
Colorado water law is accordingly vulnerable to the criticism of the Review Draft of the National Water Commission,
namely, that state law is wrongheaded in its failure to provide
recognition and protection for the social values of water. Two
specific recommendations of the Review Draft are worth
34
noting:
1. State property rules relating to water should authorize water
rights to be acquired for all social uses, noneconomic as well as
economic. In particular, recreation, scenic, esthetic, water
quality, fisheries, and similar instream values are kinds of social
uses, heretofore neglected, which require protection. As these
values, and rights in them, are recognized and protected in
natural lakes and streams, their benefits should be clearly mandated for general public use, particularly when they are uniquely
suited to such uses.
3. Public rights should be secured through state legislation
authorizing administrative withdrawal or public reservation of
sufficient unappropriated water needed for minimum streamflows in order to maintain scenic values, water quality, fishery
resources, and the natural stream environment in those watercourses, or parts thereof, that have primary value for these
purposes. 3 5
B.

Transmountain Diversions

The

problems

recommendations

associated
in

with

Colorado turn

implementation
to a

large

of

degree

these
on the

political and legal tangle involved in transmountain diversions.
The use of water in its basin of origin is to a large degree
compatible with preservation of the environmental values recommended by the National Water Commission.

The location of

transmountain diversion works at high elevations on the West-

ern Slope, on the other hand, can disrupt those values.

Their

32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3 (7) (Supp. 1969). In the celebrated
fish case, where failure to make a diversion from the stream was fatal
to the appropriation, the Rocky Mountain Power Co. also argued that
sustenance of fish life was not a beneficial use. The supreme court did
not specifically deal with this point. Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 136, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
33 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir.
1913).
34 This appears to be inconsistent with the National Water Commission's
endorsement of the market place as a favored mechanism for reallccating water use.
85 NWC 7-115 to -116.
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location has been dictated by economics and practicality.
Willingness to accommodate environmental considerations on
the part of new transmountain diverters may be expected to
grow as water becomes more scarce.
The significant fact about transmountain diversions is that
in Colorado general principles of the appropriation doctrine
control. The basin of origin has no right to receive the natural
flows of those steams.3 6 The right to appropriate water from
one river basin for use in another basin is clear in Colorado.
From the earliest reported cases to the present day, the Coloado Supreme Court has upheld an appropiator's right to make
use of water without geographical limitation. This result is
perfectly consistent with the theory of prior appropriation, for
it is a doctrine founded on the right to remove waters from
a stream. There is no language in the Colorado constitution
which implies any restriction that water be used in its basin
of origin, and the Colorado Supreme Court has repeatedly and
unequivocally upheld the rights of transmountain appropriators. In Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Association v.
Colorado River Water Conservation District,37 dealing primarily
with conditional decrees for water rights to be used in transmountain diversions, the court stated, in response to an argument that the City and County of Denver had no right to make
transmountain diversions:
We find nothing in the Constitution which even intimates
that waters should be retained for use in the watershed where

originating.
The waters here involved are the property of the public,
not any segment thereof, nor are they dedicated to any geo-

graphical portion of the state.
The right to appropriate water and put the same to bene38
ficial use at any place in the state is no longer open to question.

The legality of transmountain diversions under the state
constitution is therefore settled. What is not settled (because
it has never been attempted) is the constitutionality of a legislative prohibition against future transmountain diversions by
private appropriators. A leading early case on the absence
of any geographical restriction on place of use of water assumes that the legislature is competent to limit diversions to
the natural basin of the water. 39 However, the language in the
36 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939);

Thomas v. Guiraud, 6 Colo. 530 (1883).
37 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961).
38 Id. at 202, 365 P.2d at 288-89.
39

Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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Metropolitan Suburban case would
40
approach.

seem to foreclose

that

We have no doubt that to curtail or prohibit diversions
under existing transmountain water rights would amount to a
"taking" of property under the constitution. Whether the state
has the power to condemn these rights is discussed later in
this report.
The only existing statutory limitation on transmountain
diversions applies to water conservancy districts. The relevant
statute is contained in the provisions for formation and operation of water conservancy districts:
However, any works or facilities planned and designed for the
exportation of water from the natural basin of the Colorado
river and its tributaries in Colcrado, by any district created
under this article, shall be subject to the provisions of the Colorado river compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act. Any
such works or facilities shall be designed, constructed and operated in such manner that the present appropriations of water, and
in addition thereto prospective uses of water for irrigation and
other beneficial consumptive use purposes, including consumptive uses for domestic, mining and industrial purposes, within the
natural basin of the Colorado river in the state of Colorado, from
which water is exported, will not be impaired nor increased in
ccst at the expense of the water users within the natural basin.
The facilities and other means for the accomplishment of said
purpose shall be incorporated in, and made a part of any
project plans for the exportation of water from said natural basin
41
in Colorado.

This provision embodies the principle of "compensatory storage," which in essence requires that any such district constructing a transmountain diversion project must in the course
of such development construct storage reservoirs sufficient to
provide for reasonably anticipated future needs of the area
from which the water is diverted without any increased expense to the users in that area. The purpose of compensatory
storage is to protect water users in areas of origin against the
threat of damage from transmountain diversions. The principle
came into the law as a concession to Western Slope interests at
the time the Colorado-Big Thompson project was under consideration in the late 1930's.42 The Fryingpan Arkansas project
also provides for compensatory storage at Ruedi Reservoir, and
for releases by the project to compensate for transmountain
diversion rights previously perfected by the Twin Lakes Reser40 Metropolitan Suburban Water Users Ass'n v. Colorado River Water Con-

servation Dist., 148 Colo. 173, 365 P.2d 273 (1961).
150-5-13(2)(d) (1963).
Biese, Contemporary Storage, 22 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 453 (1950).

41 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
42
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voir and Canal Co. at its Independence Pass diversion works. 43
Compensatory storage places an additional burden on conservancy districts contemplating transmountain diversions. The
statute does not apply to private appropriators or municipalities. Thus, compensatory storage requirements do not apply
to Denver's transmountain diversions.
Even its applicability to conservancy districts is now under
attack. Central Colorado Water Conservancy District was recently denied conditional decrees for transmountain diversions
because it made no provision for compensatory storage.44 We
are informed that an appeal from this ruling challenging the
constitutionality of this statute is pending.4 5 It is quite possible
that the court will not have to decide the case on constitutional
grounds, for as a creature of statute, the conservancy district
may well be held without capacity to challenge its organic act
and the limitations thereby imposed.
Confronted with a legal system which permitted transmountain diversions, Western Slope interests attempted to limit
these projects by the terms of various decrees entered. In City
& County of Denver v. Sheriff 4 -an attempt to limit a Denver
transmountain decree to usage only when Denver's Eastern
Slope rights were insufficient for its needs was struck down.
The supreme court held that "geographical advantage" did not
apply to water, and that Denver, as an appropriator, was
entitled to a full, unfettered property right for its Western
Slope appropriation.
It is worth noting that transmountain water is peculiarly
valuable. The special status of water that is imported into a
stream system from another stream system was signalled in
Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood.4 7 Englewood sought a
decree permitting change of point of diversion for certain water
rights in the South Platte River, which it had purchased in
order to develop a water supply independent of that of Denver.
One contention raised in opposition to the change was that if
Englewood were permitted to make the change and develop its
own water supply, it would no longer need water from Denver,
and Denver would consequently need to import less water from
H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 130, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of Central Colorado
Water Conservancy District, W-48 (Garfield County District Court, Oct.
26, 1972).
45 At the time of this writing a motion for new trial is pending.
46 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
47 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
43
44
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the Western Slope, thereby decreasing the amount of waste
and return flow water accruing to the South Platte River from
Western Slope sources to the alleged detriment of Eastern Slope
appropriators. The supreme court dismissed this contention,
stating that "appropiators on a stream have no vested right
to a continuance of importation of foreign water which another
has brought to the watershed." 48 This statement reflects the
general principle that water which an appropriator brings to
a stream from a foreign source, which otherwise would not
reach the stream, may be used by that appropriator without
regard to the claims of other appropriators on the stream, and
that appropriators on a stream do not have any right to the
49
continuance of such imported water.
Attention has recently focused on the rights of a municipality importing water by means of a transmountain diversion
to recycle that water or make more than one use of it before
discharging any return flow into Eastern Slope streams. In
1969 the following statute was enacted:
Right to reuse of imported water.- Whenever an appropriator
has heretofore, or shall hereafter lawfully introduce foreign
water into a stream system from an unconnected stream system,
such appropriator may make a succession of uses of such water
by exchange or otherwise to the extent that its volume can be
distinguished from the volume of the streams into which it is
introduced. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair
or diminish any water right which has become vested. 50

This statute patently approves the concept of multiple use of
transmountain water, and in so doing it is consistent with the
general law relating to imported or independently developed
water.
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case reinforced the effect
of this statute, and in fact declared that the right to reuse may
exist even independently of the statute. In City & County of
Denver v. Fulton Irrigating Ditch Co.5 1 the primary issue was
whether Denver could make more than one use of its imported
water and dispose of it in whatever manner it saw fit after
such use. The court defined three types of use of water which
were in question: re-use (subsequent use of imported water
for the same purpose as the original use), successive use (subsequent use for a different purpose), and the right of disposiId. at 377, 237 P.2d at 122.
See San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Prairie Ditch Co. & Rio Grande
Drainage Dist., 84 Colo. 99, 268 P. 533 (1928); Ironstone Ditch Co. v.
Ashenfelter, 57 Colo. 31, 140 P. 177 (1914).
50
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-2-6 (Supp. 1969).
5' 506 P.2d 144 (Colo. 1972).
48

49

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL.

50

tion (the right to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of
effluent containing foreign water after distribution to the city
water system and collection in its sewer system). The court
held that all three types of actions were permissible, and that
they would be permissible even independent of the 1969 statute.
The city's right to take such action, however, was qualified by
its obligation to honor existing contractual obligations to the
contrary.
In summary, the present law in Colorado is that transmountain diversions may be made, subject only to the general
rules of appropriation and, in the case of conservancy districts,
to the requirement of compensatory storage. Transmountain
water may be used freely by the appropriator, and it may be
used more than once by the appropriator unless some act of
the appropriator constitutes a surrender of that right to re-use.
The most significant aspect of the law of transmountain
diversions is that the right to make such diversions is now
regarded as an incident of the prior appropriation system. The
reported Colorado cases do not consider the constitutionality
of legislative restrictions on transmountain diversions by appropriators. If transmountain diversions were to be limited
by statutes generally protecting the basin of origin against
all "foreign" appropriators, we would anticipate a strong constitutional challenge, the argument being that an attempt to
give geographical advantage conflicts with the dedication of
waters of the state to appropriation, and conflicts with the constitutional absolute guarantee of the right to divert unappropriated waters.
The likelihood of the court sustaining these constitutional
arguments is very high. If the people of Colorado wish to
limit new appropriations for transmountain diversions, the only
certain method is by appropriate constitutional amendment.
A statutory effort alone seems likely to fail.
C.

The Property Right in Water

Prior appropriation is the law of "first in time, first in
right." Article XVI, section 6, of the constitution provides:
"Priority of appropriation shall give the better right . . . ." Accordingly, priority to the use of water has therefore been
characterized by the courts as a property right.
Property rights in water consist not alone in the amount of the
appropriation, but, also, in the priority of the appropriation. It
often happens that the chief value of an appropriation consists

in its priority over other appropriations from the same natural
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stream. Hence, to deprive a person of his priority is to deprive
him of a most valuable property right. . . . A priority of right
to the use of water being property, is protected by our constitution so that no person can be deprived of it without "due process
52
of law."

Although the Colorado courts have consistently agreed
that a priority to the use of water is a property right, there
has been some confusion as to the nature of that right. As
property, its owner may sell it, separate and apart from the
land, or change the place of use or point of diversion, as
long as rights of other appropriators are not injured. 53

It is not

a mere revocable privilege, and the right to changes in place of
use or point of diversion are not dependent on statutes, but are
an inherent incident of ownership. 54

It

is often described as a

usufructuary interest:
[A]fter appropriation the title to this water, save, perhaps, as to
the limited quantity that may be actually flowing in the consumer's ditch or lateral, remains in the general public, while
the paramount right to its use, unless forfeited, continues in the
appropriator. 55

The right has been variously characterized as a freehold, 5 an
interest in real estate, 57 and a property right lacking the dignity of an estate in fee.58 When reduced to possession, as when
diverted into a ditch or reservoir, water takes on the character
of personal property. 59
The property right in water is specific, referring to a quantity of water, a point of diversion, a specific time period within
which it can be used, and often a particular use. A basic
limitation on the property right in water is that an appropriator
acquires the right to only that quantity of water which he puts
52 Nichols v. McIntosh, 19 Colo. 22, 27, 34 P. 278, 280 (1893).
53 Sherwood Irrigation Co. v. Vandewark, 138 Colo. 261, 331 P.2d 810
(1958); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Rocky Ford Canal, Reservoir, Land, Loan
& Trust Co., 79 Colo. 511, 246 P. 781 (1926); Seven Lakes Reservoir Co.
v. New Loveland & Greeley Irrigation & Land Co., 40 Colo. 382, 93 P.
485 (1907); Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 12 Colo. 12, 19 P.
836 (1888).
54 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
55 Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 587-88, 17 P. 487,
489 (1887) (emphasis added).
56 Gutheil Park Inv. Co. v. Town of Montclair, 32 Colo. 420, 76 P. 1050
(1904); Grand Valley Irrigation Co. v. Leshes, 28 Colo. 273, 65 P. 44
(1901); Monte Vista Canal Co. v. Centennial Irrigating Ditch Co., 22
Colo. App. 364, 123 P. 831 (1912).
57 West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947);
Talcott v. Martin, 20 Colo. App. 488, 79 P. 973 (1905).
58 Knapp v. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 131 Colo. 42, 279
P.2d 420 (1955).
59 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
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to beneficial use. For example, a right to the use of water for
irrigation is limited in time and volume by the needs of the
land, and the limitation is said to be read into every decree
declaring such a right.60 When the needs of the land are satisfied, the water must no longer be used by the appropriator, but
must be permitted to flow uninterruptedly in the natural channel of the stream. 61 The amount of water which by careful
management and use is reasonably required to be applied to any
given tract of land in order to assure proper irrigation is frequently referred to as the duty of water.6 2 This is not a hard
and fast unit of measurement, but varies according to conditions. This doctrine is clear enough with regard to agricultural
users (although it can hardly be said to be rigidly enforced),
but the applicability of these concepts to municipal water
decrees is not clear. In at least one reported case, the supreme
court indicated that municipalities enjoyed special privileges
63
with respect to standards of use.
Just as a decree is only evidence of an absolute water right,
it is quite likely that a conditional decree is only evidence of a
conditional water right. This conclusion is certainly implied in
Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. White River Electric Association,6
where a mere applicant for a conditional decree was held to
have a vested property right entitling that applicant to contest
(and presumably to be protected) in a change of point of diversion proceeding sought by a prior appropriator. The logical
extension of this holding is that one who has done sufficient
acts entitling him to a conditional decree also has a property
right for which he must be compensated if it were destroyed.
If a mere applicant has such a property right, then it follows
that a decreed conditional right is in an equal position.
D. Conditional Water Rights
Very early Colorado recognized that some planned appropriations would take substantial time to complete, and that to
refuse to secure such claims a place in the priority system
would militate against the undertaking of desirable projects.
Accordingly, the concept of the conditional decree was devel6

ONew Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 40 P. 989 (1895).
61 Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 120
Colo. 423, 210 P.2d 982 (1949); New Mercer Ditch Co. v. Armstrong, 21
Colo. 357, 40 P. 989 (1895).
62 Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 150 Colo. 91, 371 P.2d 775 (1962).
63 City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
But see Baker v. City of Pueblo, 87 Colo. 489, 289 P. 603 (1930).
64 151 Colo. 45, 376 P.2d 158 (1962).
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oped.""' A claimant who establishes a firm intent to appropriate
certain waters and undertakes certain acts in furtherance of his
plan is, upon completion of his appropriation, entitled "to relate
back" his priority date to the time he launched his project.
A conditional decree evidencing this right to relate back can
be obtained so that the claimant can make his investment with
security. If and when the appropriation is perfected, the holder
of the conditional decree may obtain an absolute decree. While
the decree is conditional, the claimant must proceed with due
diligence in prosecuting his appropriation.
This area of the law has led to considerable litigation and
a considerable body of case law. What constitutes the "first
step" entitling the claimant to a date to which he may relate
back is a question of fact determined by the court in light of
all the circumstances.'; In City & County of Denver v. Northern
0 T
it was held that "the
Colorado Water Conservancy District,
right may relate back to the time when the first open step was
taken giving notice of intent to secure it." ' s The element of
intent to appropriate must be accompanied by some physical
demonstration of the intent and whether these have accrued
is to be determined on an ad hoc basis69 Whether due diligence
in perfecting the appropriation has been exercised is also a
question of fact; the size and complexity of the project, the
extent of the construction season, the availability of materials,
labor and equipment, the economic ability of the claimant, and
the intervention of outside delaying factors such as wars, strikes,
and litigation 'are all to be considered in making such
determination. °
E.

Preferences

Colorado, like most appropriation states, recognizes a hierarchy of right to use of water. Unlike many other states,
however, in Colorado the hierarchy is established by the
constitution:
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the waters
of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service of all
those desiring the use of the same, those using the water for
domestic purposes shall have the preference over those claiming
6,Sieber v. Frank, 7 Colo. 148, 2 P. 901 (1883).
Elk-Rifle Water Co. v. Templeton, 173 Colo. 438, 484 P.2d 1211 (1971).
130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992 (1954).
Id. at 388. 276 P.2d at 999.
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power
Co., 174 Colo. 309, 486 P.2d 438 (1971).
7" Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir &
Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 468 P.2d 853 (1970).
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for any other purpose, and those using water for agricultural
purposes shall have preference over those using the same for
71
manufacturing purposes.

Although the Colorado constitution would on a literal reading appear to grant an absolute preference in water to domestic
uses - as, in fact, is the case in some riparian states - the
Colorado cases construing this provision have limited the preference to a right to condemn for a superior use upon the payment of just compensation.
This interpretation is a judicial development. The history
of this development is significant; accordingly it is traced in
some detail.
In Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs,72 the City of Colorado Springs sought to add to its decreed municipal water supply certain existing irrigation water rights. One of the points
raised on appeal was:
To the extent the use made by the city is purely for domestic
purposes, has it the right, without compensation, to take waters
73
theretofore appropriated for agricultural purposes?

Colorado Springs claimed a right to do so by virtue of the constitutional preference. The court appeared to put great stock
in the fact that the water rights which Colorado Springs wanted
had vested prior to adoption of the constitution, and\ this fact
"exempted this case" from constitutional preference. Thus,
property rights in water which had arisen prior to the state
constitution could not be taken without compensation. This
holding was founded on the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and upon Sections 3, 15, and 25 of the Colorado constitution's Bill of Rights.
Although the opinion is based on the inability of an 1876
constitutional provision to affect a pre-1876 right (and hence,
one would think, on the assumption that post-1876 rights could
be taken for preferential uses without compensation), the penultimate paragraph expressly reserves any ruling on such takings of post-1876 rights:
From anything that we have predicted upon the fact that the
water-rights desired by the city antedate the adoption of our
constitution, we are not to be understood as intimating that, if

art. XVI, § 6. This arrangement is quite different from
that of Oregon, which has by statute adopted a more sophisticated
preference scheme favoring multiple uses over single purpose uses,
upstream uses over downstream, and requiring the maintenance of
minimum stream flow for the preservation of aquatic life. ORE. REV.
STAT. § 536.310 (1971).
72 16 Colo. 61, 26 P. 313 (1891).
73 Id. at 66-67, 26 P. at 315.
71 COLO. CONST.
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the contrary had been the fact, the rule requiring compensation

to be made when such rights are taken for a higher use would
be different. 74The determination of this question is not involved
in this case.
The next preference case, Armstrong v. Larimer County
Ditch Co., 75 was decided shortly after Strickler. The Larimer
Ditch Co. maintained a ditch for irrigating and domestic purposes, and thereby served approximately 200 families, many of
whom depended on the ditch for their sole supply of domestic
water. Its priority was a junior one on the Cache La Poudre. The
water commissioner ordered the headgate of the Larimer Ditch
closed in order that the flow of the stream be available for
senior rights. The Larimer Ditch then obtained an order restraining this act and a decree that it was entitled to water
sufficient for the domestic needs of those served by it.
On appeal the court was moved by the fact that rights
injured by the Larimer Ditch's claim had vested prior to the
adoption of the constitution:
The error into which the learned judge seems to have fallen
was in regarding these constitutional provisions [article XVI,
sections 5, 6] as retrospective, and so far retroactive as to impair,
if not destroy, property rights acquired long before its adoption.
Such cannot be its construction. It must be construed to be
rights and powers
declaratory of, and not destructive of, the
76
enjoyed by the people before its adoption.

The court held that section 5 recognized the rights of prior
appropriators, and that to allow the Larimer Ditch the decree
it sought under section 6 would destroy what had been granted
in section 5, and would be contradictory to article II, section
15, which requires compensation for takings of private property.
In Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co.,77 the Montrose Canal claimed, by virtue of the preference system, to have
the constitutional right to divert 50 c.f.s. of water regardless of
priority for domestic use, and sought to deprive the Loutsenhizer Ditch of its senior decreed irrigation priority. The
supreme court disagreed:
[The preference] is not intended . . . to authorize a diversion of
water for domestic use from the public streams of the state, by
means of large canals, as attempted in this case. The use protected by the constitution is such use as the riparian owner has
at common law to take water for himself, his family or his
stock, and the like. And if the term "domestic use" is to be given
a different or greater meaning than this, then as between such
74 Id. at 74-75, 26 P. at 318.
75 1 Colo. App. 49, 27 P. 235 (1891).
7,;
Id. at 58, 27 P. at 238.

-723 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532 (1896).
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enlarged use and those having prior rights for agricultural and
manufacturing purposes, it is subject to that other constitutional
provision requiring just compensation to those whose rights are
78
affected thereby.

The court noted that in Strickler v. Colorado Springs the
preferences were held inapplicable to pre-1876 rights, and that
such prior rights were entitled to compensation before there
could be a valid taking. The court did expand this holding
to include compensation for senior rights acquired since 1876;
however, its reasoning was partly based on the notion that communities desiring to invoke the preference would be wasteful
in effecting their diversions.
In Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 79 the
petitioner brought a quiet title suit against the Town of Sterling,
and sought to quiet title in certain spring water for domestic
and irrigation uses first made by the petitioner in 1898. Sterling
contended that it was entitled to the spring waters without
compensating the petitioner. It based its defense on the preferences and upon a statute authorizing towns to take water to
supply domestic needs of inhabitants, which provided:
[I]f the taking of such water in such quantity shall materially
interfere with, or impair, the vested right of any person or persons, or corporation, heretofore acquired, residing upon such
creek, gulch, or stream, or doing any milling or manufacturing
business thereon, they shall first obtain the consent of such
person or persons, or corporation, or acquire the right of domain
by condemnation as prescribed by the constitution and laws upon
that subject, and make full compensation or satisfaction for all
the damages thereby occasioned to such person or persons, or
corporation.8 0

The statute became effective July 3, 1877, and Sterling argued
that since any rights of the petitioner did not arise until 1898,
the petitioner's interest was acquired subject to divestiture to
any town, without compensation.
The court held that such an interpretation of the statute
would make it "clearly unconstitutional." The preference for
domestic use
does not entitle one desiring to use water for domestic purposes
...
to take it from another who has previously appropriated it
for some other purpose, without just compensation ....
That a
city or town cannot take water for domestic purposes which has
been previously appropriated for some other beneficial purpose,
78

Id. at 237, 48 P. at 534.

79 42 Colo. 421, 94 P. 339 (1908).
80

An Act to amend an Act entitled "Towns and Cities," § 2, [1874] Colo.
Sess. Laws 10th Sess. (now COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 139-32-1(78) (Supp.
1969)).
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without fully compensating the owner, is so clear that further
8
discussion seems almost unnecessary. 1

With regard to a harder question, that is, the right of Sterling
to take water that was already used for domestic purposes, the
court's approach was more cautious:
The right of a city to divert water for the use of its inhabitants
is not superior to the right of an individual, or a farming community, to divert water for domestic or other purposes, in the
sense that the city make take water for that purpose from those
who have previously appropriated it for the same, or some other,
8 2
beneficial use, without compensating the senior appropriators.

The import of this dictum is that a city or town can take al
individual's domestic water supply if the city or town were
willing to pay compensation and proceed by eminent domain.
Black v. Taylor83 is the last significant case in which the
preference is considered. The supreme court there stated:
Some basis for confusion of thought may be found in the opinion
of this court in Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23
Colo. 233, 48 Pac. 532, in which the court said, with reference to
the domestic use of water: "The use protected by the Constitution is such use as the riparian owner has at common law to take
water for himself, his family or his stock, and the like." However, following our opinion in Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch
Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 94 Pac. 339, there can be no doubt
concerning the right to appropriate water for domestic purposes
and the interpretation to be given the constitutional preference
relating to such appropriations. Such water user cannot be preferred over a prior appropriator for irrigation purposes without
fully compensating the senior appropriator for the loss sustained
84
by invoking the preference.

A number of hard questions with regard to the preference
system have not been confronted by the Colorado courts. Those
who have sought additional water have resorted either to
development of new appropriations or purchase in the market
of existing rights. There are no reported cases in which a water
user invoked the constitutional preference in aid of a condemnation action.
It is possible that the preference might also be a protection
against condemnation. Since domestic users are preferred, an
attempt to condemn an existing domestic right for agricultural
or manufacturing purposes might be resisted on the grounds
that the constitution shields domestic uses from conversion to
a less preferred use. This prospect is startling in that if pushed
81 Town of Sterling v. Pawnee Ditch Extension Co., 42 Colo. 421, 426-27,

94 P. 339, 340-41 (1908)

(emphasis added).

82 Id. at 427, 94 P. at 341.

83 128 Colo. 449, 264 P.2d 502 (1953).
84 Id. at 457, 264 P.2d at 506.
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to this extreme conclusion, the preference would limit the
state's acquisition of water rights by condemnation if the state's
purpose were not a preferred (domestic or agricultural) one.
Thus, there is a possible conflict between the sovereign power
of eminent domain over private property, and a constitutionally
protected use for a certain kind of property.
As a general matter, the power of eminent domain is the
inherent authority of a nation or sovereign state to take, or
authorize the taking of, private property for public use without
the owner's consent. This power is inherent in the State of
Colorado as an attribute of its sovereignty, and the Colorado
constitution, article II, section 15, has been construed as limiting a pre-existing power.8 5 The State of Colorado is also limited
in the exercise of its eminent domain powers by the due process
requirements of the Federal Constitution. s 6
Other than by constitutional or statutory grant of the
power, no lesser entity of government has the power of eminent
domain. Thus, a municipality has no inherent right of condemnationY7 The grant of the right must be clearly expressed
88
or necessarily implied.
The Colorado constitution makes several specific grants
of the eminent domain power. For example, article XVI, section 7 grants all persons and corporations the right to condemn
a right-of-way across public, private, or corporate lands for construction of ditches, canals, and flumes for conveying water for
domestic, irrigation, mining, manufacturing, and drainage purposes. This grant is self-executing in that it does not depend
upon any statutory enactment for implementation.8 9 The availability of the grant to private persons is confirmed in article
II, section 14:
Private property shall not be taken for private use unless by
consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and
except for reservoirs, drains, flumes or ditches on or across the
lands of others, for agricultural, mining, milling, domestic or
sanitary purposes. 90

Article XX, the home rule amendment for cities and towns,
85 Colacino v. People, 80 Colo. 417, 252 P. 350 (1927).
86 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613

(1935).
87 Beth Medrosh Hagodol v. City of Aurora, 126 Colo. 267, 248 P.2d 732

(1952).
88 Potashnik v. Public Serv. Co., 126 Colo. 98, 247 P.2d 137 (1952).
89 Town of Lyons v. City of Longmont, 54 Colo. 112, 129 P. 198 (1913).
!o

COLO. CONST. art. III, §1 14. The United States does not consider its
property subject to this Colorado grant of eminent domain powers.
Users of United States' lands uniformly obtain special use permits
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also delegates to entities organized thereunder full power to
exercise eminent domain to attain any lawful public, local, or
municipal purpose. This grant is to some degree limited to the
attainment of local purposes, and may be superseded by the
legislature when the concern or purpose becomes of statewide,
and not merely local, interest21
Case law indicates that the preference system is only a
grant to preferred users of a right to exercise the power of
eminent domain. What has been expressly decided is that the
preference cannot be invoked to divest other rights without
payment of compensation. No reported case involves a condemnation of a water right with payment of compensation tendered.
Accordingly, the precise operation of the preference system is
an unknown. The resolution of this problem probably only
becomes necessary if the State of Colorado should determine to
attempt condemnation proceedings against preferred rights. If
the state's goals can be constitutionally achieved without condemnation, then the precise workings of the preference system
can await future determination.
F. Changes in Water Rights
The increasing demand for water and the scarcity of further
'unappropriated" waters point to increasing market pressure
on existing decreed rights. Sales and conversions of senior agricultural rights to uses the market now prefers are likely to
multiply. Colorado law accommodates this process in statutory
proceedings known, since passage of the 1969 Act, as "changes
in water rights." Prior to the 1969 Act, a similar result was
2
obtained by "change in point of diversion" proceedings
As a general proposition, the owner of a water right is free
to exercise it just as the owner of a fee interest in land may put
it to the use he chooses. However, Colorado water law very
early in its history developed a significant limitation on changes
in use of water rights that had no precise equivalent in use of
and rights-of-way pursuant to federal law. It is worthy of note that
the United States appears to be showing more reluctance to grant these
special use permits when environmental damage is alleged. In the case
of new transmountain diversions, a major hurdle is obtaining the right
to traverse forest lands. A condition that the Forest Service apparently
intends to attach to future permits is the requirement of release of
sufficient stream flows to sustain forest values below the diversion.
Whether the Forest Service will be successful in this new approach remains to be seen.
31 City & County of Denver v. Sweet, 138 Colo. 41, 329 P.2d 441 (1958);
People v. Graham, 107 Colo. 202, 110 P.2d 256 (1941); People ex rel
Carlson v. City Council, 60 Colo. 370, 153 P. 690 (1915).
92 Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 28 P.2d 247 (1933).
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land."" This limitation is that no change in a water right is to
be permitted if the change will injuriously affect the rights of
4
other appropriators on the streamf
Decrees for water rights as a general matter specify particular uses, such as irrigation, for the water right. Also, it is a
recognized principle that a water right is limited by its historic
use pattern. 5 Accordingly, a water right owner is from the
outset limited in his nature of use by his decree and past
practices.
In making all changes the subject of "change of water right"
proceedings under the 1969 Act, the legislature in large part
adopted and codified the existing case law of changes in point
of diversion.
The United States Constitution contains no specific reference to water rights; however, the basic protections of property
afforded by the Constitution are applicable to water rights.
This Federal Constitutional protection derives from the fifth
and fourteenth amendments which assure that there shall be no
taking of private property without compensation and due process
of law.
The Colorado constitution does of course deal specifically
with water rights, but it makes no reference to changes in water
rights. Accordingly, the origin of the right to change a water
right was not pinned to any constitutional provision; rather,
the right to change was treated as an incident of ownership of
property. 6
The 1969 Act is the present statute providing the mechanisms for legal recognition of changes of water rights. It defines
changes of water rights very broadly:
"Change of water right" means a change in the type, place, or
time of use, a change in the point or points of diversion, a change
from a fixed point or points of diversion to alternate or supple93 Land owners are limited by nuisance laws and these are perhaps the

nearest equivalent.
94 Ackerman v. City of Walsenburg, 171 Colo. 304, 467 P.2d 267 (1970);
Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575,
272 P.2d 629 (1954); City of Colorado Springs v. Yust, 126 Colo. 289,
249 P.2d 151 (1952) ; Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo.
366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951); Hassler v. Fountain Mut. Irrigation Co., 93
Colo. 246, 26 P.2d 102 (1933); City & County of Denver v. Colorado
Land & Livestock Co., 86 Colo. 191, 279 P. 46 (1929); New Cache La
Poudre Irrigating Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 49 Colo. 1, 111
P. 610 (1910); Diez v. Hartbauer, 46 Colo. 599, 105 P. 868 (1909); Cache
La Poudre Reservoir Co. v. Water Supply & Storage Co., 25 Colo. 161,
53 P. 331 (1898); Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 26
P. 313 (1891).
"5 City of Westminster v. Church, 167 Colo. 1, 445 P.2d 52 (1968).
06 Lower Latham Ditch Co. v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 41 Colo. 212, 93 P. 483
(1907).
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mental points of diversion, a change from alternate or supple-

mental points of diversion to a fixed point or points of diversion, a change in the means of diversion, a change in the place
or places of storage, a change from direct application to storage
and subsequent application, a change from storage and subsequent application to direct application, a change from a fixed
place or places of storage to alternate places of storage, a change
from alternate places of storage to a fixed place or places of
storage, or any combination of such changes. The term "change
of water right" includes changes of conditional water rights as
97
well as changes of water rights.

The statute contemplates that any person desiring such
change of water right shall seek judicial approval. A change is
to be allowed if it "will not injuriously affect the owner of or
persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a
decreed conditional water right." 9 If a proposed change would
cause such injury, and certain conditions may be imposed on
the change which would prevent such injury, the change is to be
permitted subject to those conditions. 9 The statute adopts the
guidelines of prior case law in giving examples of appropriate
conditions: limitations on the use of the water right, relinquishment of part of the decree to compensate other protesting appropriators, time limitations on the proposed diversion, and
any other conditions that "may be necessary to protect the
vested rights of others."'10 0 Any party to a proceeding in which a
change is sought is to have the opportunity to present conditions which may alleviate such injury.
The 1969 Act reflects what has been the law of Colorado
for many years, namely, that the holder of a water right may
change his exercise of that right, but only to the extent that
no other appropriator, junior or senior, suffers any adverse
effect on his vested rights. This constitutes a very significant
limitation on the exercise of a water right as a property right.
The statutory rule has its origins in the case law's recognition of a water right as a property right. Once the analogy to a
property right in land is made, it logically follows that the
owner can exercise dominion by making changes in the uses
to which he put his property. Thus, in Brighton Ditch Co. v.
City of Englewood,1° 1 the supreme court stated that the right to
change the place of use and point of diversion of a water right
"is an inherent property right, not conferred by our remedial
97 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(11) (Supp. 1969).
98 COLO. REV.STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(3) (Supp. 1969).
99 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21 (3), (4) (Supp. 1969).

100 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-21(4) (Supp. 1969).
101 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116 (1951).
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statute, but pre-existing as an incident of ownership, and always
enforceable so long as the vested rights of others are not in'10 2
juriously affected.
If the only change is a change in ownership, there is no
limitation on that right to transfer, and there is no requirement
of approval from the water court.10 3 Conveyance of water
separate from the land, however, almost invariably is accompanied by some type of change in use, either in the purpose for
which the water is used, the place at which the water is used,
or the point at which the water is diverted. Those changes are
strictly limited to protect the rights of all other (junior and
senior) appropriators on the particular stream system.
The salient fact regarding changes in water rights under
existing law is that all restrictions on changes are designed to
protect other private water rights owners from injury. Research
does not disclose one case where changes were restricted or
denied in order to accommodate the proprietary interest of the
"public" or the "people" in water. The litigation on changes
has been purely a property quarrel between private interests,
with the express object of protecting vested rights.
Until adoption of the 1969 Act, standing to contest a change
in point of diversion was clearly limited to those alleging injury
to vested rights. As the court stated in Brighton Ditch Co. v.
City of Englewood, "No protestant may properly object to
change of point of diversion on grounds that others than himself would be harmed thereby.' 10 4 That result was consistent
with the then governing statute on changes in point of diversion. 10 5 As is discussed elsewhere in this article, the 1969 Act
may have liberalized this rule on standing, for it permits "any
person" to file a statement of opposition, and "any person interested" to participate in a trial on the matter before the water
court.10 6

II. WHAT IS THE STATE OF COLORADO'S INTEREST IN WATER
The language of the Colorado constitution'0 7 purports to
102 Id. at 372-73, 237 P.2d at 120.
103 As a consequence, the State Engineer has no accurate information on who
owns what water rights.
104 124 Colo. 366, 372, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (1951).
105 Law of April 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 24, [1943] Colo. Sess. Laws 630, repealed,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9 (Supp. 1969).
106 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (a)
(Supp. 1971), amending COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (Supp. 1969).
107
The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated,
within the State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the
property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter
provided. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
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give the public a property interest in the waters of the state.
Although the precise language might be read to mean that the
waters appropriated prior to the adoption of the constitution
are excluded from whatever property right the public has, it is
now generally thought that all waters are subject to the public
right. 108 However, by making waters which are property of the
public subject to appropriation, Colorado authorized the subsequent creation of private property rights in those waters. 10 9
The nature of the private property right created has been discussed above. In short, the legal theory is that the "people" or
the "public" own the waters, and that an appropriator owns a
priority to use of water."" This usufructuary right in the appropriator is a property right which can be taken or damaged only
upon payment of compensation. Colorado case law has concerned itself with creation and protection of private rights
and paid little heed to the public right. There is the distinct
possibility that the property rights (in any traditional sense)
remaining in the public by reason of ownership of the waters
of the state are not extensive.
Other appropriation states have not relegated the public
property interest in water to so insubstantial a position. In permit states, the state engineer is often authorized to refuse to
grant permits for water use if he determines the application is
not in the public interest. Utah has considered authorizing its
governor to withdraw from further appropriation waters flowing in segments of designated streams.11 1 This state power is
presumably based on the public's property interest in water. Mr.
Edward Clyde, in a legal study for the National Water Commission, notes:
While private rights can be acquired to use water, and while
these rights are property interests which are entitled to protection and cannot be taken without due process and payment of
just compensation, it is fundamental that the state has an
interest in the use of the water resource which justifies regulation to govern the manner in which the resource shall be used.
The concept that the state has a dominant interest in the use of
the water resource by private individuals has been a part of the
law of the West from the very beginning. .

.

. In

short, the

108 Kuiper v. Well Owners Conservation Ass'n, 490 P.2d 268 (Colo. 1971);

Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968). The Declaration of Policy to the 1969 Act does not limit the public's property right
to waters unappropriated at the time of adoption cf the constitution;
rather, "all" waters "have always been and are hereby declared to be
" COLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1)
the property of the public ....
(Supp. 1969).
109 Fort Morgan Land & Canal Co. v. South Platte Ditch Co., 18 Colo. 1, 30
P. 1032 (1892).
110 Wheeler v. Northern Colo. Irrigation Co., 10 Colo. 582, 17 P. 487 (1887).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 50

vital public concern in a wise and judicious use of the water
resource justifies and requires state regulation. 112

The Colorado constitution and cases decided thereunder pose
a number of obstacles in the path of a full implementation of
the Clyde thesis to Colorado water law. The early cases show
an inclination to regard a perfected appropriation in water as
the right to defeat the public's property right:
By such appropriation and by reason of the diversion and sep-

aration of the water from the volume of the stream the title of
the public or people was divested and the appropriator became

the owner. 113

This language is properly limitable to a holding that water
itself is unsusceptible to private ownership until diverted from
the stream, and before such diversion, the appropriator owns
only a right to divert. This traditional recitation does not, however, solve the problem, for if the right to divert is in private
hands, how can the state retain a right to stop future diversions? A partial answer to this question is that the state has the
undoubted power to halt wasteful or nonbeneficial uses.1 14
Athough very distinguished jurists 15 long ago called for
treatment of water as a public asset not subject to private ownership, Colorado to this day sanctions and encourages the creation of private property rights to use of water. The constitution
guarantees the right to divert unappropriated waters. The enunciated public policy of the state serves this end, for the Declaration of Policy to the 1969 Act states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state of Colorado
that all waters originating in or flowing into this state, whether
found on the surface or underground, have always been and are
hereby declared to be the property of the public, dedicated to
the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriationand
use in accordance with law. As incident thereto, it shall be the
policy of this state to integrate the appropriation, use and administration of underground water tributary to a stream with
the use of surface water, in such a way as to maximize the
beneficial use of all of the waters of this state." 6

There appear to be significant limits on the extent of the
public right in water. To assert at this date that the State of
111

E.

CLYDE, ADMINISTRATiVE

ALLOCATION

OF WATER

49 (National Water

Commission Legal Study, 1972).
112 Id. at 31-33.
113 Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 1 Colo. App. 480, 497, 29 P. 906,
911 (1892).
114 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35 (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(7) (Supp. 1971).
115 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27
HARV. L. REV. 195, 234 (1914).
6
11 CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-2(1) (Supp. 1969) (emphasis added).
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Colorado retains an overriding property right in waters previously appropriated by private persons, which overriding right
would authorize the state to destroy the interests of private
appropriators, appears untenable for two reasons. First, the
established law in Colorado clearly recognizes the property aspect of a water right; hence, it is not likely that the courts
would at this date sanction any new theory drastically expanding the nature and extent of the public's property rights at the
expense of private water rights previously created (vested
rights). Second, (although this is really not a legal observation)
it is doubted that the best interests of our society are served if
the State of Colorado, having acquiesced in the creation of
private property rights for 96 years, now attempts to advance a
"public" property right at the expense of citizens who acted,
presumably in good faith, and certainly with no indication of
state opposition, in acquiring private rights during that period.
It should be noted that the United States feels no such nice compunctions about asserting for itself ancient property rights in
water, unknown until legal theories invented only nine years
ago in Arizona v. California.117 Nevertheless, it is felt that the
example of the United States is unworthy of a sovereign, and
one should agree with the Review Draft of National Water Commission that if the sovereign chooses to take, for its own use,
water rights previously acquired under state law, it should
do so by condemnation, and pay value therefor 1 8
This is not to say the public's property right to waters is
best buried for all time. Not all regulation by the state is
confiscatory of private property. The public property right and
the State of Colorado's unquestioned "police" power under the
Federal and state Constitutions are authority for the proposition
that private water rights are subject to state regulation and
administration which are consistent with the constitutional protection of private property and the provisions of article XVI,
sections 5 and 6.119 The growth of governmental regulation of
property is a history of balancing legitimate state interests with
conflicting private property rights. 120 What is now matter-of117 376 U.S. 340 (1963).
118 NWC 13-5 et seq.

"9West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476 (1947).
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as
applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now
uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex
conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which

120

justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of auto-
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factly accepted by way of governmental activity would have
outraged lawyers and citizens of earlier eras. Thus far there
has been little regulation by government of water rights except
to justify curtailment of waste and nonbeneficial uses by private appropriators. That does not mean the power to do more
does not exist.
The unique language of the Colorado constitution has great
significance in any attempt to define constitutional regulation
of appropriations under these powers. Since the constitution
flatly states that the "right to divert unappropriated waters
shall never be denied," any attempt absolutely to prohibit new
appropriations, whether by a "moratorium" or a "withdrawal,"
would undoubtedly face challenge on that constitutional ground.
A moratorium with respect to perfection of pending conditional
decrees or claims and pending changes in water rights would
be challenged as a "taking" without compensation.
The reference to unappropriatedwater has led some persons
to suggest that the state might halt all new appropriations on
the theory that no unappropriated waters remain. This approach
does not appear promising for practical and legal reasons. The
"'new" water rights which could be affected by this tactic are
probably not substantial. Existing conditional decrees and pending claims for conditional decrees, if perfected, will probably
cause full appropriation of Colorado's streams. But if unappropriated waters are available, then there is a constitutional problem with the guarantee of the right to divert. The case law
indicates a literal interpretation of that proviso, for valid appropriations may be created after the flow of a stream is subject
to call for prior appropriators. 121 This holding was without
benefit of a statute whereby the availability of unappropriated
waters was determinable and relevant; however, the reasoning
of the case was that in an appropriation state, waters may in
the future become available (e.g., when seniors have no need or
in a flood), and hence the right to make an appropriation
mobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been
condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly ccming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should
be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving
due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall.
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
121 Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank, 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093
(1909).
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thereof could not properly be precluded.
One of the merits often suggested for a "permit" state, such
as Wyoming, is the power of the administrative authority to
withhold a permit on the ground that no waters are available
for appropriation. In conversation with C.J. Kuiper, the State
Engineer, Mr. Kuiper noted the anomaly that is now occurring
in Colorado: numerous conditional decrees are sought for water
rights the priority for which is so junior that in any strict
12
administration of priorities they will never be satisfied. 2
The continued creation of "unfillable" conditional decrees is
no doubt objectionable to administrators of state waters. In support of the existing system, one can argue that if no water is
ever available in fact to fill the claim, no absolute decree will
ever issue, for there will have been no diversion and application to beneficial use. But if in fact there are no more unappropriated waters in a given area, then it would appear a waste of
judicial effort to attend to the adjudications of these claims
when as a practical matter these conditional rights will not be
perfected.
With regard to new applications for surface water rights
in certain areas (e.g., the Arkansas River Basin), the Division
Engineer routinely opposes the award of further decrees on the
ground that there is no unappropriated water available to satisfy the decree. It also appears that the courts routinely disallow this objection on the theory that the constitution and the
rule in Humphreys Tunnel & Mining Co. v. Frank 23 afford
appropriators the undeniable right to perfect further appropriations, even though the new priorities will be satisfied only in
the event of rare flood occasions. However, the approach is
quite different with regard to wells, where the State Engineer
has statutory authority to deny new permits to construct wells
when he finds that exercising the permit would cause injury
to other vested rights.124 Yet only by diverting (pumping)
water out of priority would a new well appear to injure vested
rights. This seeming inconsistency between the law on acquiring surface water rights and wells has not faced a constitu1 25
tional challenge.
Interview with C.J. Kuiper, Colorado State Engineer, in Denver, Colorado, Oct. 27, 1972.
123 46 Colo. 524, 105 P. 1093 (1909).
124 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-18-36(2)
(Supp. 1971).
121 The Colorado Supreme Court in Hall v. Kuiper, 510 P.2d 329 (Colo.
1973) upheld the State Engineer's denial of two well permits even
though no adverse effect to any individual vested right was proved;
only a general adverse effect to the stream was shown. This case has
thus resolved the point against potential ground water appropriators.
122
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Customarily, the State of Colorado has not appeared in
water proceedings to assert any interest of the "public" or the
"people" in either dispositions of the public waters to private
appropriators or changes of water rights. Until the 1969 Act,
adjudications of water rights and changes in point of diversion
were in practice mere contests between rival claimants for water
rights. The Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that the general public had an interest in the outcome of these adjudication
suits, but attempts by litigants to assert those interests of the
public were rejected. 126 Under the rule in Arkansas Valley Co.
v. Hardesty Co. 127 one who opposed a water claim was constrained to justify his opposition by an allegation of injury to
his own water right.128
The relegation of the general public's interest to that of a
silent observer, unrepresented by counsel, which was to be protected, if at all, by the judge, is probably consistent enough
with the traditional underpinnings of the doctrine of appropriation, and the law's traditional hostility to "private attorneysgeneral." For, if the constitution provides that all water is
subject to appropriation by private interests on a first come,
first served basis, and if the constitution further provides that
the right to divert shall never be denied, then there is little
point in making adjudication suits anything other than a struggle amongst rival appropriators. It is only when one lacks confidence that any of the competing users will make the proper
use of the water resource that reason to challenge the traditional limitations on "standing" to be heard in water contests
arises.
The existing water law of Colorado does not recognize the
possibility that appropriators may seek to develop water rights
which, although beneficial uses under existing law, are nonetheless socially undesirable for the public at large. If the use
is "beneficial" in terms of the applicant's economic needs, that
suffices. The water law now assumes that all growth and
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 96 P.2d 836 (1939).
In this case, Western slope interests urged that by allowing Denver to
acquire further Colcrado River waters, the vital interests of the people
might be jeopardized. The supreme court refused to consider the notion
that taking water out of one basin might be contrary to the "people's"
interest.
127 85 Colo. 555, 277 P. 763 (1929).
128Bond v. Twin Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 496 P.2d 311 (Colo. 1972).
The rule stated in the text applies to surface rights. With the holding
in Hall v. Kuiper, the right to new appropriations has been significantly limited. See note 125 supra.
126
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development give rise to "beneficial" uses of water, and in
allocating the water, awards the first claimant. Thereafter
the free market may cause a shift in uses, but the law is not
concerned with the merit or demerit of the choice the market
makes.
The Colorado Supreme Court has declared that the term
"beneficial use" is not a term defined by the constitution: "What
is beneficial use, afer all, is a question of fact and depends upon
the circumstances in each case.' 1 29 This reluctance to infuse an
absolute meaning or definition to a constitutional term may
offer some promise for the state in controlling water uses. If
the legislature were to define beneficial uses as those which
conform to a state water plan, there is a reasonable prospect
of upholding the statute.
The 1969 Act indicates a slight departure from prior law's
treatment of water adjudications as squabbles between competing private proprietary interests. While prior law expressly
limited the right to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce
evidence to water rights owners whose water rights were affected by the claim at hand, 3 0° the 1969 Act provides that "any
person" may file a statement of opposition to an application,"'
and the recitation of previous statutes which tied this right to
protest to persons who allege injury to their own vested water
rights is omitted. At trial of the claim, the 1969 Act also provides that "All persons interested shall be permitted to participate ....
,,132 The term person is defined by the 1969 Act
broadly:
"Person" means an individual, a partnership, a corporation, a
municipality, the state of Colorado, the United States of America,
or any other legal entity, public or private.133
Whether the 1969 Act was designed to expand the class of
parties who might contest water claims has not been determined by the Colorado Supreme Court. That question is confronting the referees and the water courts now in various proceedings. In at least one instance a trial court has ruled that
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(1939).
1'3 See Law of April 19, 1943, ch. 190, § 10, [1943] Colo. Sess. Laws 620,
repealed, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-9 (Supp. 1969).
131 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(1) (b) (Supp. 1971).
1:32 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1971).
133CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-3(2) (Supp. 1969).
121*
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the 1969 Act did expand the class.134
If the 1969 Act does expand the class which may oppose
water claims, the ultimate issues to be determined by the water
court probably remain unchanged from prior laws. The 1969
Act is silent with regard to the grounds on which an opponent
might base his objection, and hence does not explicitly expand
the grounds of inquiry in disputed water claims. New claims
still turn on the claimant's proof of diversion and beneficial
use, in terms of priority of use. The 1969 Act does not authorize
denial of claims on the ground that the use of the water may
be inconsistent with state policy on growth or land use, or that
the claimant's use is less desirable in social terms than no use
at all, or that the use will wreak environmental damage. In the
case of changes of water rights, the sole issue specified by
statute is still a classic property dispute; namely, will the
change cause injury to the owner or person entitled to use other
135
vested water rights?
The 1969 Act also broke new ground by inserting the division engineer into all determinations of water rights proceedings.
In the case of applications heard by a referee, the referee must
consult with the division engineer and file in the cause a
report on the substance of the consultation. 13 6 In the case of
applications heard by the water judge (which, unlike hearings
before the referee, are conducted in the manner of a regular
trial) "the division engineer shall appear to furnish pertinent
1 37
information and may be examined by any party.'
What information is "pertinent" is not defined in the 1969
Act. The conclusion is that the division engineer's testimony is
probably limited by existing law to issues of less concern to the
state than to rival appropriators. For example, a division engineer could support or contradict facts alleged in the cause, of
which he had knowledge, and could probably offer expert testimony in certain kinds of cases. In changes in water rights, his
records may support testimony as to historic amounts of water
available for transfer by the water right in question, and he
might be qualified to offer expert testimony on whether an
134 Correspondence with Michael D. White, Esq., Master-Referee for the
135

136
137

Water Court for Divisions 4, 5 and 6, in United States water claims case
pending in the District Court for Garfield County.
A transfer could also be resisted on the grounds that a proposed use is
not a beneficial use. Thus, a transfer for purposes the law does not
recognize is assailable.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(4) (Supp. 1971), amending COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-18(4) (Supp. 1969).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. S 148-21-20(3) (Supp. 1971).
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exchange proposal or a plan of augmentation would injuriously
affect other vested rights to water. But in none of these proceedings does the division engineer advance any proprietary
interest of the State of Colorado in the use or disposition of
public waters. His opinion on the claim as a wise and judicious
use is relevant only in the context of traditional notions of
waste or actual beneficial use, and his role seems to be that of
an aide to the court in determining the truth of the matters
asserted.
Under present law there is a very good possibility that the
attorney-general could make an appearance on behalf of the
State of Colorado, and participate in water determination hearings. If he were directed to do so by statute, the likelihood of
overcoming challenges to "standing" would be greater, for any
challenge would then be directed to the constitutionality of the
statute. It appears the state's property right and the police
power are sources of constitutional power on which to base this
138
state activity.
However, unless the scope of inquiry in water matters is
much enlarged so as to put before the court the basic issues
occasioning state interest, there is only a limited gain to be had
from state participation. The limited gain is that by policing all
claims, the state would keep claimants honest. No doubt there
is a need for some entity to shoulder this burden, for the
adversary system we have now depends upon an opponent with
financial wherewithal, but this approach does not deal directly
with the desirability in social terms of future water uses.
The state could choose to appear and attempt to assert in
pending applications for new water rights or in change cases
that a proposed use is nonbeneficial because of the adverse
impact the new use or transfer would have on public interests.
A court would be more likely to depart from traditional
notions of beneficial use and give consideration to this state
assertion if there were a statutory expression that the scope of
inquiry was to be widened.
III.

OBSERVATIONS

A. Impetus to Consumptive Water Uses
The doctrine of prior appropriation as we know it in Colorado contemplates the full use and consumption of all the water
in the state. The usages that are favored are traditional applica13-sSee West End Irrigation Co. v. Garvey, 117 Colo. 109, 184 P.2d 476
(1947).
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tions of water in furtherance of economic development: more
industry; more farming; more human consumption. Full consumptive use of all Colorado waters may serve goals of economic development at the expense of what are referred to as
noneconomic values, that is, scenic, aesthetic, and environmental values.
There are external pressures promoting full usage of water,
especially with regard to the Colorado River. The assumption is
widespread that failure to make immediate full use of Colorado's share of Colorado River water will constitute a waiver of
the right to increase consumptive uses in Colorado at a future
date. This argument deserves thorough investigation and
13 9
analysis.
B.

Recognition of Social and Environmental Water Values

The present Colorado water law does not afford protection
for non-economic values. By virtue of express constitutional
provision all water is available for appropriation by diversion
to beneficial uses. The Colorado Supreme Court has refused
to permit an "appropriation" for an in-stream fishery on the
grounds that it did not involve a diversion. 140 This decision
probably bars any "appropriation" to protect in-stream, noneconomic values.
The water law should be flexible enough to accommodate
the noneconomic values which the public may hold. The Review
Draft of the National Water Commission recommends five legislative actions by states such as Colorado:
(1) reserving portions of streams from development and setting them aside as "wild rivers;"
(2)
authorizing a public agency to file for and acquire rights
in unappropriated water;
(3) setting minimum stream flows and lake levels;

(4)

establishing environmental criteria for the granting of

permits to use water;
(5) forbidding the alteration of watercourses without State
consent.141

Accommodation of these five goals in Colorado is difficult
under our constitution and decided cases. The first point,
reservation of waters from development, runs directly counter
139 The experience of the San Luis Valley would indicate that some established economies are displaced by compact obligations. Texas and New
Mexico appear to have successfuly held Colorado to that amount of
water awarded in the Rio Grande compact.
140 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co.,
158 Colo. 331, 335, 406 P.2d 298, 300 (1965).
141 NWC 7-4.
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to the language of article XVI, section 6, that the right to divert
unappropriated waters shall never be denied.
The second point is the technique that was attemped and
failed in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Rocky
Mountain Power Co.1 42 The Conservation District, pursuant to
statutory authorization, sought to make an appropriation for instream values. The supreme court said that there could be no
appropriation without actual diversion from the stream. Presumably the court did not mean to strike down impoundments
of in-stream reservoirs. Whether the proposed use qualified
as a "beneficial use" is unclear in the decision. This case does
present a formidable obstacle to a statutory accommodation of
"noneconomic" in-stream values. It is possible, of course, that,
confronted with a statute defining diversions to permit instream flows, and defining beneficial uses to include in-stream
fisheries or other environmental considerations, the court would
reverse or distinguish away prior case law. This is a matter of
conjecture. A surer remedy is a constitutional amendment. The
utility of such a statute or amendment, in a practical sense,
will depend on the availability of "unappropriated" waters in
fact.
The third point, establishing minimum stream flows, also
appears to run contrary to the constitutional right to divert
unappropriated waters. If that proviso cannot be circumvented
by making an appropriation for in-stream values, then it would
seem that a constitutional amendment is indeed necessary.
The fourth point, establishing environmental criteria in
awarding a water right, would seem to hold favorable possibilities. All water is subject to appropriation for beneficial use.
The supreme court has held that "beneficial use" is not defined
in the constitution, and is a question of fact. 143 A statutory
definition of beneficial use which required consideration of environmental impact before according the diversion the status of
a beneficial use might well withstand the inevitable legal
assault.
The fifth point, forbidding alteration of watercourses, was
once law in Colorado. The previous statute was not even honored in its breach, and was replaced in 1969.144 Presumably this
158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965).
City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 105 Colo. 193, 204, 96 P.2d 836, 842
(1939).
144
No person owning or controlling any reservoir, lake or body
of water into which public waters flow and which furnishes
the water supply in whole cr in part to any stream containing
142
143

fish, shall divert or lessen such water inflow or supply to an
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statute could not halt water diversions pursuant
constitution.
C. Prospects for State Impact on Future Water Uses
1. An overview
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The State of Colorado is not, under present law, charged
with advancing or protecting the public interest in the applications for water rights or for changes of water rights. Under
existing law, litigants in water matters advance private proprietary interests. If the General Assembly were by statute
to assert that water rights should not be granted or changed
unless the result was consistent with the public interest, and
charge an appropriate state agency with advancing or protecting
that interest in water proceedings, challenges to its constitutionality would undoubtedly be made.
Conceivably, the state might now choose to designate an
agency with legal staff to participate in all water determinations to assure that all water rights applications do in fact meet
existing legal criteria. The 1969 Act permits "any person" to
file protests to claims, and permits "any person interested" to
participate in a hearing before the water court. 145 The "interest" requisite for Colorado participation could be said to arise
from its proprietary interest in public waters. There is a good
chance that the courts would afford the state "standing" under
existing law.
The utility of this approach is limited, although the state
would be a litigant, for the fundamental questions giving rise
to the state participation would continue to be beyond the scope
of the water court's inquiry. For example, it is of no moment
under present water law whether the award of a water right or
a change of a water right is consistent with a state water plan
or a state land use plan. Likewise, the water court is not concerned with the social and environmental impact of a claim for
a water right or a change of a water right. Further, the fact
that the proposed uses by rival applicants for the same water
have varying degrees of benefit to the state at large is
irrelevant.

45

1

extent detrimental to the fish in such stream, reservoir, lake
or body of water.
Law of April 27, 1899, ch. 98, § 13, [1899] Colo. Sess. Laws 198. This
statute was codified as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 62-9-16 (1963). In
1969, however, Chapter 62 was repealed and re-enacted, and this section
was entirely deleted. Law of July 1, 1969, ch. 157, § 1, [1969] Colo. Sess.
Laws 430.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1), 148-21-20(2), 148-21-20(3)
(Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1)(b),
148-21-20(2), (3) (Supp. 1971).
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The constitution, as interpreted to date, does not allow
direct choices to be made between competing applicants on the
basis of merit; it awards new rights on a first-in-time basis. In
the case of changes in water rights, Colorado law denies changes
only if other appropriators are injured. This right to a change
is an aspect of the constitutionally protected property right.
An attempt to insert into determinations of new water
rights state concern over the kinds of questions (now ignored)
discussed above would face intense political and legal challenges. The probable legal arguments against such a course of
action would be:
a. That it would violate the constitutional
vision guaranteeing the right to divert waters.

pro-

b. To the extent that it favored a junior claimant
to the right over a senior claimant on the ground that
his use was of greater benefit to society, it would violate the constitutional provision that "priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between those
using the water for the same purpose."
It is settled law that this proviso means priority of appropriation gives the better right as between all users, with certain
"preferred" users having the right to satisfy their needs by condemnation of nonpreferred rights. Accordingly, there is little
point in attempting to allow the courts to choose between applicants on "merit."
In order to overcome the legal arguments of unconstitutionality, one would have to envisage a Colorado Supreme Court
willing to forsake a generally accepted interpretation of article
XVI, sections 5 and 6 and to reassert the public's concern with
disposition of its waters. Courts do depart from yesterday's
standard interpretations; whether they would do so here is conjectural. To sustain before the supreme court departures from
generally accepted tenets of the law of prior appropriation is
a substantial burden indeed, but perhaps there has never been
so favorable a climate in which to raise these questions. As a
matter of logic, there is no compelling reason to conclude that
the State Legislature is powerless to define "beneficial uses,"
"appropriations," and "diversions" in new appropriations to
accord with the felt necessities of today.
The assertion of a state interest in changes of water rights
would also face legal and political challenges similar to those
outlined above. Additionally, it will be argued that to restrict
changes in furtherance of a state interest would represent an
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unwarranted and unneeded state interference in the affairs of
the citizenry and in the optimum working of a free market economy. This is not a legal argument. The inclination of the state
to play a larger role in the ordering of our society is pronounced, and the decision is properly a political one to be made
by the people and their elected representatives. Also, it would
probably be argued that to restrict changes in water rights to
conform with a state interest in land and water use would constitute a "taking" for which compensation must be paid.
There is a good chance to uphold a statute whereby a
change in water right might be made to depend upon a finding
by the water court or other authority that the change was in
accord with a state policy on land and water use. The success
of this approach would probably depend in great measure upon
the specificity with which the state interest was spelled out.
In a sense this argument turns on the proposition that a use is
not beneficial when it contravenes enunciated state policy. This
conclusion is based on the fact that changes in water rights
are now said by the court to be an "inherent" property right.
The "inherent" right to change the use of other kinds of
property (e.g., land) has been limited by exercise of the police
power.
Other jurisdictions seem to control development, growth,
and density through more traditional land controls. One obvious merit of the traditional land approach is its lack of novelty.
However, as a conceptual matter, imposing state controls on
water transfers seems no more revolutionary than land controls
were 50 years ago. (It should be noted that land controls have
not always enjoyed immediate acceptance from the courts.)
2.

Conditional Decrees

The claims for water rights that have recently generated
substantial public controversy are conditionally decreed water
rights, or claims for conditional decrees now pending in proceedings before the water courts. Many people feel that perfection of all claims and conditional decrees will truly cause all
Colorado waters to be fully appropriated. The projects for
many conditionally decreed rights will probably never be built,
and hence some "unappropriated" waters will be available for
other uses. The entities with economic power sufficient to build
the projects are municipalities. Reclamation projects for agriculture do not have a healthy appearance.
Conditionally decreed water rights have been called "in-
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choate" interests by the courts, 146 but they are nevertheless property rights. If the owner fails to proceed with reasonable diligence to perfect the conditional right, it can be cancelled by the
court and the holder suffers a loss of his priority. 147 What constitutes reasonable diligence in a particular case is a question of
fact - a question that has given rise to a large body of litigation.1 48 There is no precise period in which a conditionally
decreed project must be completed; the courts have repeatedly
acknowledged that the time required may vary according to the
magnitude of the project, the economic resources of the appli14
cant and the economic conditions prevailing in the society. ' If
an applicant is making a bona fide attempt to complete his
project there is little likelihood that the conditional decree will
be cancelled.
Because of the ease with which conditional decrees may be
kept alive for many years, it has occasionally been suggested
that some fixed period of years be established in which a conditional decree be perfected or suffer cancellation. In 1969 the
general assembly was urged to place a 5-year (prospective)
limit on completion of all conditional decrees; failure to meet
the limit was to cause cancellation of the priority. This proposal
is widely unpopular with major water developers. The Board of
Water Commissoners of the City and County of Denver does not
wish to be forced immediately to construct projects, which, in
any reasonable planning scheme, will not be needed until 1990.
Quasi-municipal districts, such as the Southeastern Colorado
Water Conservancy District and perhaps also the Colorado River
Water Conservation District'"0 hold conditional decrees for water
rights which will not be perfected to absolute decrees until Congress appropriates sufficient funds to construct the projects.
The struggle to authorize these projects and the investments
made to date in reliance on various conditional decrees are, in
146
147
148

149

150

Conley v. Dyer, 43 Colo. 22, 28, 95 P. 304, 306 (1908).
COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-17(5) (Supp. 1969).
Cclorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir &
Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 468 P.2d 853 (1970); City & County of Denver
v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d 992
(1954).
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Twin Lakes Reservoir &
Canal Co., 171 Colo. 561, 468 P.2d 853 (1970).
The Colorado River Water Conservation District may not object to a
fixed time period. Its major projects for which it holds conditional
decrees are also the subject of claims by the United States in pending
proceedings. The United States is seeking a better priority date than
the district obtained, and the United States asserts that federal rights
are not subject to loss for failure to show diligence in perfecting the
appropriation. Thus, if a federal right is obtained, the district's in-terests are placed beyond attack by rival Colorado appropriators.
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some cases at least, very substantial. The question then arises
whether, with such examples in mind, it would be constitutional
for the State of Colorado to impose a fixed time period for
completion of all conditional decrees.
It is believed that the state has the power to establish a
time period in which any new conditional decree, applied for
after enactment of the statute, must be completed in order for
the claimant to relate his priority date back to the time he
launched his claim. The doctrine of "relation back" is nowhere
embodied in the Colorado constitution; it is a judicial and legislative creation that is designed, according to our courts, to
allow large undertakings to proceed with secure knowledge
that the owners' priority position will be protected if they
complete their projects. The doctrine of relation back has been
held to be "in derogation of the Colorado constitution" and
hence to be strictly construed. Accordingly as to new claims
(not now decreed or applied for) the Legislature can, if it
chooses, either abolish the doctrine or limit it severely by
imposition of a fixed time limit for showing diligence.
Altering the test of reasonable diligence with regard to conditional decrees heretofore granted or now applied for in pending proceedings poses more difficult problems. Take the hypothetical case of a conditional decree previously entered, pursuant to which the owner has invested capital and is proceeding
with what the law now regards as due diligence even though
it may take 15 years to complete the project. A statute which
caused the loss of his priority unless he completed the project
in 5 years would undoubtedly be challenged by that claimant
as a taking, without compensation, of his property right. The
courts probably would be sympathetic to such a claim.
In order to sustain such a statute, it would have to be
shown that the regulation was reasonable and not abitrary. To
make no provision for extensions of time in cases where a fixed
period would work obvious inequities would invite an overturning of the statute.
Cases in which a claim for a conditional decree is pending
pose problems as well. Presumably in such cases, a claimant
has invested sufficient funds and energy to entitle him to a
conditional decree. If the project is large, for which a completion plan reasonably contemplates an extended period of
time, an imposition of a shorter, fixed period of time in which
the claimant cannot reasonably be expected to complete the
project, has the appearance of confiscatory legislation and hence

COLORADO WATER LAW PROBLEMS

also a taking for which compensation would be required.
Both conditionally decreed water rights and claims for
conditional water rights are property rights under Colorado law.
Their value may be less than perfected rights but they are nonetheless property. In Rocky Mountain Power Co. v. White River
1
' the supreme court held that a mere
Electric Association5
claimant to a conditional water right had a "vested right"
entitling him to contest a perfected water right owner's petition
for a change in point of diversion:
[O]ne who is entitled to a conditional decree defining his rights to
water for future application to use has a vested right which he
may protect in case of any action by others to destroy or injure
52
that right.'

This recognition of a property right in a claimant to a
conditional decree would logically extend to a holding that an
'unreasonable" or "arbitrary" destruction of that property right
by the state might constitute a taking. Determination of what
is "arbitrary" is obviously at the root of the problem.
In the case cited, Rocky Mountain Power Co. alleged expenditure of approximately $700,000 in furtherance of its claim.
Rendering such a project impossible of completion by imposition of a short fuse would be to invite the court to strike such a
statute down. No doubt there are steps that can be taken to
cause courts to impose a firmer standard with respect to diligence; however, an uncompromising legislative attempt to void
existing claims and conditional decrees seems unpromising.
Changes in water rights will have an increasing impact on
water use for there is a discernible trend for senior agricultural
rights to be converted into domestic or municipal rights.
Changes of water rights are complex and expensive, and are not
permitted when the proposed change will injure other appropriators. The expense and complexity of changes are presently a
deterrent to conversions, but with market forces demanding
water for development purposes, the costs of transfers are borne
more readily.
Transmountain diversions for agricultural purposes are the
obvious targets for such changes. It is easier to obtain a change
in water rights for foreign water than native water. Other
appropriators cannot frustrate changes of foreign water with
1 3
the ease that is possible in changes of native water.
151 151 Colo. 45, 52, 376 P.2d 158, 162 (1962).
152 Id. at 53, 376 P.2d at 162.
'53 A principal private perfected agricultural transmountain right, Twin
Lakes Reservoir and Canal Company's Independence Pass transmoun-
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3.

Some limitations on state activity
There are necessarily flaws of omission in attempting to
condition changes and new appropriations in conformance with
new state standards. First, the new standards would not deal
with existing applications for conditional decrees or existing
conditional decrees unless at some later date the owners sought
a change in water right - a very unlikely event in the case of
any right now held for municipal purposes.
Second, it is questionable whether federally funded reclamation projects could be affected by state regulation in reallocations of water rights within project lands. In at least one
project, Congress has determined that municipal applicants be
preferred in use of project water. The extent to which state
law can displace the applicable federal law is questionable.
Third, the preference system in the constitution appears to
grant a constitutional right to acquire water for domestic purposes by condemnation. This grant is not limited to any class
of domestic user. It would appear that even individuals possess
it. If, for example, the state water and land use plans called
for preservation of a certain area as green belt, and the state
plan was a valid consideration in a transfer proceeding, denial
of the change sought by a municipality on the ground that the
change would destroy the green belt would appear to frustrate
the preference system.
If the preference is an absolute constitutional right to
acquire water for a domestic use, then perhaps it deserves
repeal. Its rigidity seems undesirable. The general assembly
certainly has the authority to confer eminent domain powers on
54
preferred users without this constitutional provision.1
Perhaps an argument can be made that the preference as
well as (prospectively) the right to divert, could be confined
by statute to natural persons. The legal merits of such an assertion have not been investigated. It would obviously engender
concerted political opposition from municipalities and other
corporate appropriators.
D.

Transmountain Diversions and United States Claims for
Water Rights
Transmountain diversions are the practical victim of main-

tain diversion, has already been sold, in part, for conversion to municipal
uses.
154 The statutes and the home rule amendment already award this power.
See COLO. CONST. art. XX; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139-32-1(78),
89-5-13(10) (1963).
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tenance of scenic rivers and minimum stream flows, for economic and engineering efficiency call for location of the facility
at high altitudes. If the need for water is great enough, presumably stream flows can be maintained and water pumped
back to the high altitude for transmountain diversions. There
has been some indication that the Denver Water Board is examining this alternative. Notions of economic limitations on what
a major municipality will pay for water may be out of date.
This solution does not satisfy those in the basin of origin whose
possibilities for future economic development are thereby
limited.
The failure of various western states to accommodate social
and environmental values in water is one of the justifications
offered by federal officials for the United States' claims to
reserved water rights.
The United States is now seeking water rights decrees for
itself in two sets of Colorado proceedings. The first is a state
water court suit and is a consolidation of claims made in divisions 4, 5, and 6 (roughly, the Gunnison, Colorado, White,
Yampa, and North Platte watersheds) as well as several statutory proceedings under pre-1969 Act law. The second is a quiet
title proceeding in federal court which the United States has
instituted with respect to waters in Water Division 7 (which
includes various regions in southwestern Colorado). (This second
case has been dismissed on the "abstention theory"; the state
courts are more qualified to decide the issue and thus the federal court will abstain.)
The United States' claims (excluding Indian claims) rest on
the theory that when certain public lands were withdrawn
from public entry and reserved to the United States, the United
States also reserved water rights necessary to effect the purposes of the reservation. The United States also claims that
certain federal water rights were created where the United
States Congress passed laws for the construction of reclamation
facilities. Further, the United States claims, with respect to its
"reserved" water rights on the national forests, that it is entitled to maintain stream flows at a level adequate to support
acquatic life and to protect aesthetic or environmental values.
The Indian water claims present unique considerations, and
are not treated here.
The claims of the United States have generated considerable
opposition from many Colorado appropriators, for the United
States seeks a priority date that is senior to a great number of
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previously adjudicated Colorado decrees. The rule of Colorado
law is that priorities are ranked according to date of adjudication. The United States, however, seeks to obtain its "true"
priority date, regardless of this Colorado rule. Some of the
major Western Slope water interests see the United States claim
as a device to limit transmountain diversions. By and large,
the United States claims antedate the transmountain diversions;
hence, to the extent the United States calls for water to satisfy
its needs, the diversion facilities along the Continental Divide
will bear the brunt of the demand. The United States also specifically claims the right to maintain a minimum stream flow
in streams located on the national forests. Transmountain diverters, who, in some cases, take the entire flow of a given stream,
regard this claim as a substantial threat to their historic water
yield. The United States' claims for decrees for reclamation
facilities on the Western Slope may obtain a more senior priority
date for those projects and provide insulation from abandonment for failure to construct the projects. The United States
seeks an earlier date for projects already decreed to its local
contracting agencies, and it also claims that the United States
is not subject to abandonment for nonuse of a water right.
The extent to which existing transmountain diversions
would be limited by entry of a decree in favor of the United
States is not known at this time. With regard to stream flow,
the United States has not yet disclosed what amount of water
it demands for each stream on the national forest. Also, the zeal
with which the Forest Service will assert any newly decreed
stream flow is unknowable at this time. Some transmountain
projects already provide for release of waters on the Western
Slope to sustain stream life. Whether the United States' claims
would affect those projects is also unknown.
The legal issues involved in the United States' claims for
Colorado waters present considerations which may reach the
United States Supreme Court. The Review Draft of the National
Water Commission, apparently conceding the United States'
legal position, proposes a number of legislative solutions to
problems arising from the federal claims for reserved rights,
including the recommendation that if the United States divests
prior appropriators under state law, then the United States
should pay compensation. Whether any such legislative relief
will be forthcoming is uncertain. Federal officials generally
regard compensation for water rights perfected under state law
as a giveaway.
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The United States claims for stream flows are not limited
to forest lands, but also include BLM lands located below the
national forests. If the United States obtains decrees for its
claims and calls for water to satisfy the decrees, some of the
environmental objectives 5 5 asserted in the National Water Commission Review Draft will be served. The end served may be
commendable, but the means, at least in the view of the National Water Commission, seem questionable, for it involves
divesting property rights heretofore enjoyed.
IV.

A.

WHAT EFFECT CAN THE STATE HAVE ON FUTURE WATER USES?

Can the State Constitutionally Affect the Present Place or
Nature of Use of Existing Water Rights?

In considering ways in which the state might have some
impact on future use of waters, a fundamental question is the
effect the state can have on the present place or nature of use
of existing water rights without violating the state constitution.
The Colorado constitution presents the general prohibition of a
taking or damaging of private property without just compensation' , and the specific protection of water rights under the
157
system of prior appropriation.
The system of prior appropriation is enshrined in concrete
in sections 5 and 6, article XVI, of the Colorado constitution.
In addition, the case law in Colorado is emphatic in its treatment of water rights as property rights which are entitled to the
constitutional protection of property. The sanctity of the property right in water has become a paramount principle in Colorado water law, as evidenced by the legal treatment of changes
in water rights, where the rule is firmly established that a
change in the exercise of a water right will be permitted unless
it adversely affects the vested water rights of any other
appropriators.
The one conceded general area of state authority over
property rights in water is authority to halt or limit wasteful
uses of water. 158 For example, an appropriator may be limited
from wasting water by excessive irrigation practices. 159 The
155 NWC 7-115 to -116.
15 6
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 15, should be considered along with the prohibition against taking of private property embodied in the fifth amendment and made applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution.
157 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5, 6.
158 CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35 (Supp. 1969), as amended, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-21-35(7) (Supp. 1971). The general proposition
is that an appropriator is not entitled to waste water.
159'See City of Colorado Springs v. Bender, 148 Colo. 458, 366 P.2d 552
(1961); Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 81 P. 37 (1905).
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consequences of a firmer regulation of use of water are to make
more water available to junior appropriators, and, if the juniors
are satisfied, to make waters available for new appropriations.
Waste of water is not strictly policed in Colorado. Decrees
previously entered have often awarded quantities of water for a
particular use that are excessive for actual needs. The curtailment of excessive diversions is, however, a thorny political
problem. Frequently cited examples of alleged "excessive"
diversions are those made by certain senior decree holders on
the Western Slope, who to some degree attempt to assure that
transmountain diversions will not benefit by any failure to
utilize old Western Slope decrees to the fullest. No doubt these
irrigators think Denverites waste water on lawns.
To propose any action involving state interference with the
present mode of exercise of existing water rights, other than
regulation of wasteful uses, is to directly confront the time
honored concepts of the "sacred" or "inviolable" nature of
property rights. A strong argument can be made that affecting
the present place or nature of use of existing water rights would
also be an impermissible denial of the "right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses,"
as guaranteed by the constitution. The argument is that the
right to divert unappropriated waters includes the right to continue diverting, once an appropriation is made. This is really a
variant of the "sacred" property right theory. To impose regulation on an existing use, and thereby force cessation or change
of such use, would be such an interference as to amount to a
denial of that water right. The constitutional right to divert
means more than just protecting an initial diversion, but
properly interpreted, this proviso does not prohibit otherwise
constitutional regulation of property rights in water.
The primary constraint on state action remains the property
right in water. Any system attempting to affect the present
uses of water rights must withstand allegations that it amounts
to an unconstitutional taking or damaging of property without
compensation, based on federal and state consitutional provisions.160 There is no doubt that state regulation and especially
unreasonable state regulation or limitation of those water rights
can amount to a "taking" or "damaging" of property. To affect
an existing water right in such a way that no reasonable use
for it remains would amount to an unconstitutional taking of
property without compensation.
160 U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV;

COLO. CONST. art.

II, § 15.
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One approach to achieving control over uses of existing
water rights would be to treat existing uses in the way that
nonconforming uses are treated in zoning law. In this way, undesirable existing uses might be phased out over a period of
time without the necessity of payment of compensation arising.
Although the law is not uniform in all the states, there is a
growing tendency in zoning law to approve mandatory phaseouts of nonconforming uses after a reasonable period of time.
Uses of property existing at the time of the enactment of a
zoning law may therefore be required to be changed, after
a reasonable period of time in which to permit the owner to
amortize his investment. In some jurisdictions it is held that
as long as the zoning plan is reasonably related to the public
interest and the phase-out period is of reasonable duration,
the nonconforming user has no recourse and must change his
use without compensation. It appears that Colorado is tending
toward acceptance of this majority view. 161
One can argue that if the property right in land may be so
affected by zoning ordinances, the property right in water
should be susceptible to similar control under state law. Thus,
the holder of a water right who is putting such right to a use
contrary to that deemed to be in the best interests of the state
might be given a certain period of years in which to cease such
use or convert to another use. As in zoning of land, that period
would give him sufficient time to amortize his investment in the
water right. If the zoning analogy will hold, one might argue
that such a phasing-out program would not conflict with the
constitutional provisions prohibiting the taking or damaging
of property.
There are, however, peculiar features of the property right
in water that lead to the conclusion that the zoning of land
analogy is not likely to carry over to phasing-out of water uses.
First, the ability of a nonconforming water user to find other
reasonable use for his property right is very limited by the
principle that no change can be allowed which would injuriously affect the rights of others. Under this principle, it is
quite possible that a water user curtailed by the state could
not obtain a change since any change would injure other private
rights. This kind of dilemma would lead courts to treat manda161 See Art Neon Co. v. City & County of Denver, 000 F. Supp. 000 (D.
Colo. 1973) where the federal district court held Denver's sign code
amortization scheme unconstitutional. That opinion indicates that the
amortization schedule must be related to economic realities and cannot
be so arbitrary as to amount to a taking without just compensation.
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tory phase-outs as a "taking." Further, requiring a change in
use might well be held to be a taking without compensation
even if such other uses were reasonable uses for the reason that
changes in use require legal proceedings and substantial
expense.
Second, imposition of a phase-out on nonconforming uses
may infringe the specific water law provisions of the Colorado
constitution. One can argue that the right to divert should be
on the same level as the right to hold property in general
and therefore susceptible to phasing-out requirements; however,
by virtue of the provision guaranteeing the right to divert,
water rights may have a special insulated status.
More troublesome are the preference provisions of the Colorado constitution. In light of the preferences, it may be beyond
the state's power to divest a preferred domestic user. For example, a state attempt to force a change in use from domestic
to agricultural would appear inconsistent with the constitutional
preference. (The same problems with respect to the constitutional preferences would arise in attempts to limit changes in
present uses from less favored uses to domestic uses.)
The conclusions are that, except for curtailing waste and
nonbeneficial uses, there is little practical prospect for affecting
the present place or nature of use of existing water rights without the payment of compensation; that phasing out nonconforming uses in water is not a promising approach; and that
the preference system poses a possible obstacle even to condemnation. In view of the constitutional and practical problems
that are presented, if an effort to affect existing uses is contemplated, it should be a supplementary and severable portion
of any overall water use legislation. The effect of the preference for domestic uses as a restraint of the state's ability to
acquire water rights by condemnation is not susceptible of a
firm answer. Questions of "dominant" eminent domain whereby
overwhelming public necessity displaces an existing public
right 162 have not, in the reported cases, confronted a preference
system.
B.

Regulation of Changes in Water Rights

One possible approach to asserting state interest in future
water use patterns is to regulate changes from existing uses
162

Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)
(federal government has power to condemn property of a state or one
of its subdivisions); Welch v. City & County of Denver, 141 Colo. 587,
349 P.2d 352 (1960) (land held for a public use may be condemned for
another public use where such taking is required by public necessity).
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that are contrary to what are legislatively determined to be in
the best interests of the state. This system would avoid the
troublesome prospect of attempting to force changes in the existing use of water rights. Rather, it would seek to regulate those
changes in use that appropriators themselves propose to make.
This approach would not permit so comprehensive a program
of conforming water use in the state to desired patterns, but it
could have significant effect on future changes of existing water
use patterns. 63 It is not unlike the concept of zoning or planning land use, where the plan is generally structured around
the existing patterns of land use at the time the zoning law
is enacted, in conjunction with the desired future pattern of
land use. Starting with the existing pattern of water use, and
regulating the manner in which that pattern is changed in the
future, it would be possible for the state to guide the development of new water use patterns along lines that it determined
would be in the best interests of the people of the state.
The obstacle with respect to initiating a system of regulating changes in water rights according to a state plan is the
certainty of constitutional challenge. This question of constitutionality cannot be definitively answered, because the Colorado
Supreme Court has never been faced with the issue. An examination of specific Colorado constitutional provisions, as well as
the general nature of the "right" to change water rights, however, may bring the answer nearer.
As related elsewhere in this article, the right to make
changes in the exercise of water rights has traditionally been
recognized as an integral part of the water rights themselves.
Court decisions have spoken in terms of the right to change
being an inherent property right existing as an incident of the
water right itself. 16 4 Despite being cast in such sweeping terms
There probably are significant limits even to this approach. For example, decrees held by water conservancy districts such as Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District are for a multiplicity of uses
over the entire district with the district board claiming the right under
its decrees to allocate its water to these various uses on an annual
basis with no application to the courts for a change in use. The United
States is the owner of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project water as
trustee for reclamation beneficiaries. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District made permanent allocations of all its water to users
by 1955. Changes in uses of project water are not submitted to the
water court. The district takes the position that it has the authority to
approve such .changes. We have not had time to determine whether
users of project water could realistically be required to submit to state
proceedings. Perhaps the boards of these districts would be amenable
to make their change procedures conform to a state plan. However,
a conservancy district's duty, pursuant to the federal law by which
its project was constructed to make reallocations of water for municipal
purposes, probably would supersede any state laws.
164 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).

163
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as an inviolable or "sacred' '165 property right, the right to make
changes in water rights has in fact been subject to strict limitation in Colorado. The basis for such limitation has been the
doctrine that no change may be made that would have an injurious effect on the vested water rights of any other appropriator. The vested rights of appropriators, no matter how junior
or senior, have always been afforded absolute protection against
any change in another water right that would cause them any
harm. The right to change is now subordinated to the right of
other appropriators to maintain the existing benefits of their
water rights as presently used, regardless of priority. In other
words, a prior appropriator really has a priority over other
appropriators only with respect to the present manner of use
of his water right. His water right does not necessarily carry
with it the right, as against other appropriators, to make
changes in the exercise of the water right, even if no greater
quantity of water is consumed thereby. 166 In this sense, despite
the sweeping language about property rights, the right to
change a water right does not have the same dignity as the
right to maintain and preserve a water right in its existing
form. The courts have totally forbidden a senior appropriator
from exercising his right to change if such exercise would have
any injurious effect which cannot be adequately mitigated by
imposing conditions on the change.
To date, the limitation on changes has been on the narrow
basis of the effect on other private rights. No reported case indicates that the change may be denied on the basis of its effect
on the public's property right in water. Any new program to
this end must be tested against several constitutional principles.
The first such consideration is the prohibition, in both the
Colorado and United States Constitutions, against taking property without just compensation. 16 The issue is whether state
regulation or curtailment of the right to make changes in water
rights constitutes a taking or damaging of property. The argument of a "taking" would be founded on the theory that the
right to make changes in the use of private property is a constitutionally protected right, and that any limitation of that
165

Strickler v. City of Colorado Springs, 16 Colo. 61, 71, 26 P. 313, 316

(1891).
166 See, e.g., Handy Ditch Co. v. Louden Irrigating Canal Co., 27 Colo. 515,
62 P. 847 (1900).
167 The federal prohibition of such takings is embodied in the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. The applicable provision of the Colorado constitution is art. II, § 15, which states that "[pirivate property shall not
be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without just compensation."
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right constitutes a violation of the constitution. A variation of
that argument might be that while the right to make changes
is not expressly awarded in the constitution, it is an essential
part of the water right itself, and therefore is not susceptible to
limitation. These arguments are considerably weakened by the
fact that the right to make changes in water rights is not now
in fact an absolute property right.
It is possible to construct a system of regulation of changes
in water rights, reasonable and in accordance with clear legislative guidelines, which does not amount to an unconstitutional
taking or damaging of property. Setting aside for the moment
the sections of the Colorado constitution dealing specifically
with water rights, the analogy of regulating water rights to
clearly constitutional regulation of property uses arising from
zoning and land planning holds promise. Property rights in
land are subject to very significant limitations in use under
zoning laws, yet such laws, if they are a reasonable exercise of
168
the police power, are upheld against constitutional attack.
There is no necessary reason to exalt water rights above other
kinds of property rights. Water rights should logically be susceptible of the same type and degree of regulation as are
other property rights. Moreover, the right to change an existing water right should, if anything, be accorded less dignity
than the right to maintain existing use. Imposing restrictions
on what types of changes may be made in a water right still
leaves untouched the existing use of that water right, and in
this sense can be considered neither a taking nor a damaging.
It is commonplace for property rights in land to be limited in
this manner by zoning laws. As long as the regulatory scheme
is reasonable and not arbitrary, and as long as it permits continued use along present patterns, the regulation of changes in
use would appear to be no more unconstitutional, in terms of
being a taking or damaging of property without compensation,
than are the restrictions imposed by zoning laws. The courts
have developed a body of law with respect to zoning that illustrates how the constitutional problems are dealt with.
Returning to the doctrine of prior appropriation, as contained in article XVI, sections 5 and 6, it may be argued that
it necessarily carries with it the right to put water to whatever
use the owner sees fit whenever he sees fit. This argument
depends on an exaltation of the property right in water to a
unique, insulated and forever unassailable position. It is be168

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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lieved that there are no property rights so utterly beyond state
control. Under a strictly literal interpretation of the constitutional language in sections 5 and 6, regulation of changes in
water rights would not appear to be unconstitutional. However,
the right to a change was not derived from those sections by
the supreme court; it was derived from the property right. 1 9
Regulation of changes in the use of water rights would therefore seem to be a permissible exercise of the police power of
the state, not in fatal conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation. One should note that special care would be necessary
in drafting a statute so that an unwitting taking did not occur.
Specific changes have heretofore been utterly denied when no
conditions would protect other rights; however, a state prohibition of the only available change might be another matter.
The third constitutional consideration is the preference
doctrine:
Priority of appropriation shall give the better right as between
those using the water for the same purpose; but when the
waters of any natural stream are not sufficient for the service
of all those desiring the use of the same, those using the water
for domestic purposes shall have the preference over those
claiming for any other purpose, and those using the water for
agricultural purposes shall have preference over those using the
same for manufacturing purposes. 170
The preference provision presents at least a theoretical obstacle
to a legislative system regulating changes in water rights. The
preference language may provide such large holes for preferred
users that the system could be rendered ultimately ineffectual.
The logical consequence of the preference provision is to
permit all water to be acquired for domestic purposes, regardless of any statutory regulation to the contrary. For example,
if, under a regulatory system, a water right used for agricultural
purposes were prevented, pursuant to an otherwise constitutional regulation, from being changed to domestic use, the
prospective domestic user could probably be expected to assert
a constitutional right, arising from the preference, to use that
water right for domestic purposes, and to seek to condemn
the right if necessary. If this invocation of the preference were
sustained against exercise of the state interest in defeating the
change in use, the regulatory system may then suffer from a
flaw of considerable proportions, namely an inability to constrain conversions of agricultural water rights to domestic pur169 Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 124 Colo. 366, 237 P.2d 116
(1951).
170 COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 6.
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poses in those cases where the change was unwanted in terms
of the state plan. In view of the probable goals of any water
use plan in Colorado at this time, the purpose of the plan might
be defeated by this application of the preference. A discussion
of systems to regulate changes in water rights should therefore
be considered in light of this contingent constitutional problem.
There are a number of approaches for asserting the state's
interest with respect to changes in water rights. The possibilities
range from completely overhauling the existing legal and constitutional framework and substituting an entirely new system
of state administrative regulation, at one extreme, to merely
attempting to increase the state's role in water proceedings
within the existing judicial system at the other.
A purely administrative system for all changes in water
rights might be desirable because of the degree of direct control it would afford the state over such changes. This type of
system, however, would be a major departure from the judicial
system of water rights determinations that has traditionally
existed and still exists in Colorado. If changes were to be
handled administratively, then perhaps other water matters
should be so treated.
It is possible, however, to construct a system for changes
of water rights utilizing an administrative authority to which
applications for changes in water rights are submitted as a
prerequisite to obtaining the traditional judicial decree for
such changes. The administrative authority would be charged
with evaluating applications in the light of the public interest,
as specifically defined by the legislature. The legislature would
have to promulgate comprehensive guidelines and standards
on which the administrative authority would base its determinations. For example, the proposed change might be required
to conform to a comprehensive state plan for water use and
growth. The administrative authority would have to be given
flexibility in changing the requirements where the public interest demanded it. It does not seem likely that the state would
wish to say that, as an absolute matter, this water shall forever be applied to irrigation of crops on a specific tract. The
legislature might spell out the types of situations in which the
public interest might demand different results. Once administrative approval were obtained, the change might then be processed judicially as under present law, and the factors presently
considered in such proceedings, such as injury to vested rights
of others, would be considered by the referee or judge. A
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decree permitting the change would then issue.
An administrative approval system coupled with a judicial
proceeding, while not a total abandonment of the present
system of water rights administration, would still be a significant departure from that system. The effect of such a system
could be as great as that of a completely administrative system,
in the sense that denial of administrative approval 7 1 would
prevent the proposed change. It is likely that opposition to
the dual type of system would be nearly as great as to a purely
administrative system.
Consideration might also be given to legislation that would
continue the water court's primary role in changes, so that the
ultimate decision to grant or deny a change in water rights
would remain a judicial question. Although the state would not
thereby gain direct, absolute control over changes in water
rights, legislation could charge the judge or referee to render
decisions in accordance with new standards of public interest
in addition to considerations of injury that have traditionally
controlled such proceedings. Something more than a broad
requirement that decisions be in accord with the public interest
would appear necessary. Legislative standards would have to be
both comprehensive and specific enough to give concrete guidance in deciding individual cases. 17 2 This specificity will also
prevent each judge's or referee's subjective concept of the
public interest from determining the future course of water
development in the state. This is easier said than done.
Regardless of the specificity of legislative standards, however, it is unrealistic and unfair in an adversary legal system
to expect that the judges and referees will consistently render
decisions in accordance with the "public interest" if the only
persons asserting positions in such proceedings are the proponents of change and other private parties seeking to serve
their own interests. If the ultimate determination of issues is
left to the water court, then consideration also ought to be
given to allowing a state agency to take an active role in
water rights proceedings, to present to the judge or referee
the state's position on the proposed change in light of the
public interest and legislative standards, and to urge the rendering of a decision that would best serve that interest.
The legislature could create a state agency or charge an
Presumably the decision of the administrative authority would be subject to judicial review just as other administrative determinations are.
It is common to limit the scope of that review.
172 See CLYDE, supra note 111, at 64-69.
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existing authority with the function of monitoring all water
proceedings wherein the legislative standards for water use in
the public interest or a comprehensive state water use plan
indicated that the proposed change should be denied.
As has been suggested elsewhere in this article, perhaps the
state can intervene in water proceedings, including changes,
even under present law, since the 1969 Act permits "any person"
to file protests to claims 173 and permits "all persons interested"
to participate in hearings before water judges. 17 4 Present law,
however, does not afford adequate basis in opposing changes
for state intervention to have a substantial effect on conforming changes to planning guidelines or to a state water plan or
land use plan. Alterations in the statutes to permit expanded
grounds for opposing changes would therefore be necessary.
The state agency need not intervene in every change proceeding. Rather, it could evaluate each pending change in light
of conformity to or effect on a state plan for water use development approved by the legislature. The agency, through an
adequate legal staff, could then enter its appearance in those
proceedings where proposed change would be inconsistent with
the legislative plan. The agency could participate in the proceeding before the referee or judge in the same manner as
other interested parties and be given full opportunity to present
its case opposing the change or urging limitation on the change.
A decision would then be rendered accordingly, which presumably would strike the proper balance between the state interest
and private rights.
Consideration might also be given to eliminating the potential dual proceedings, before referee and water judge, which
may occur under the present statute, at least with respect to
cases in which the state agency would participate. It would
seem better, in cases in which the new state agency was to
participate, to have just one proceeding that would determine
whether or not the change should be permitted (except for
appellate review).
It is beyond the scope of this article to attempt to suggest
the types of legislative standards or the nature of a water use
plan to be used in this program. The requisite legislative guidelines could take either the form of a comprehensive set of
73
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CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1), 148-21-20(2) (Supp. 1969), as
amended, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 148-21-18(1) (b), 148-21-20(2)

(Supp. 1971).
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(Supp. 1969), as

(Supp. 1971).

amended,

COLO.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 50

objective standards, to be applied in change proceedings to the
particular facts involved, or that of a comprehensive state
water use plan, delineating the future patterns of use desired
(and determined to be "beneficial") in the various regions of
the state. The substantive details of either manner of legislative declaration must be the result of major policy decisions,
integrated into a workable plan for implementaion. The important point, from a legal standpoint, is that the legislative
plan be comprehensive enough to permit assertion of the state's
interest in all cases of changes of water rights throughout the
state, yet flexible enough to meet the exigencies of individual
cases. Finally, the policies to be served must be clearly and
reasonably related to the welfare of the people of the state in
175
order to be a proper exercise of the police power.

175 See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

TOWARD A JURAL PASIGRAPHY
By

THOMPSON

G. MARSH*

A generation before the term came in vogue, Professor
Marsh was an interdisciplinarian.Applying his extensive background in mathematics and logic, he has taught thousands of
first year law students the art of case analysis. The following
article is the fruit of Professor Marsh's study and teaching in
Analytical Jurisprudence.t No more fitting tribute to Professor Marsh's scholarship can be found.
INTRODUCTION

HE vast irrelevance of analytical jurisprudence is of course
reciprocal. It does not affect, nor is it affected by the
nature of justice, the nature of man, the nature of nature, or
the nature of God. It is not concerned with the source of law,
whether it be the command of the sovereign, the social compact, the resultant of social forces, reason, social evolution, or
whatever. It has nothing to do with the function of law, as a
means of leading men to happiness and the good life, as a
means of social control, or as a stabilizing influence.
Analytical jurisprudence is almost as abstract as mathematics, and it is therefore inherently universal, unaffected by
time or place or content.
T

It is the purpose of this essay to develop another similarity
between analytical jurisprudence and mathematics - a specialized written language composed of nonword symbols.
The utility of the customary symbols of mathematics will
be appreciated if one solves a problem in long division in ordinary literary form, using sentences composed of such words
as divisor, dividend, quotient, and subtrahend. It is believed
that for analytical jurisprudence as for mathematics, a language
composed of nonword symbols is more useful than one composed of words and sentences.
Ideas may be symbolized by words or by nonword symbols.
A language or system of nonword symbols is called a pasigraphy. A jural pasigraphy is proposed.
Charles W. Delaney, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; A.B., 1924, LL.B., 1927, M.A., 1931, University of Denver;
LL.M., 1931, Northwestern University; J.S.D. 1935, Yale University.
t For those interested in further reading in the area, see Marsh, The
Legal Continuum, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 459 (1969).
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
How should a jural pasigraphy be constructed? Alfred
Korzybski has deplored the inadequacy of ordinary language,
with its basic form of subject and predicate. He has said that
it is ill suited for the expression of processes and that what is
needed is a language that closely resembles the form of the
subject matter.'
In order to develop such a language for analytical jurisprudence- a jural pasigraphy - the form of which would
closely resemble the subject matter, it is of course necessary
to determine the form of the subject matter.
It is always difficult to identify the origin of an idea, but
Huntington Cairns credits Johann Fichte with having isolated
the conception that the basis of law is the idea of the legal
2
relation.
The conception of Law is the conception of a relation
between rational beings. Hence it results only when such
beings are thought as in relation to each other. It is nonsense to speak of rights between man and nature, or between
man and the ground, soil, or animals, etc., as such....
It is only when two persons are related to the same

thing that a question arises as to the Right to the thing, or,
more properly expressed, as to the Right which one person

has against the other to exclude him from the use of such
thing.3
A plausible explanation for the introduction of this Fichtean idea into the study of analytical jurisprudence in the
common law can be found in the fact that John Austin spent
the winter of 1827-28 in Germany, preparing himself for his
lectures on jurisprudence at the University of London. This
in itself would justify the assumption that Austin became
acquainted with the work of Fichte, and the assumption is
confirmed by that part of Austin's 45th lecture in which he
criticized one of Fichte's statements about the function of
4
government.
From Austin the course of development is clear: Holland
(1880), Hohfeld (1913), Kocourek (1927). The high point was
reached by Hohfeld. Though he did not mention Fichte, his
'A. KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY (4th ed. 1958).

It is believed that
his thesis has been correctly stated, but it is difficult to find quotable
passages of reasonable length in this discursive book. The material
beginning at the following pages is relevant: 50, 57, 59, 66, 92, 96, 110,
224, 227, 254, 261, 371, 563.
2 H. CAIRNS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHY FROM PLATO TO HEGEL 469-71 (1949).
3 Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts nach den Principien der Wissenschaftslehre, in THE SCIENCE OF RIGHTS 81-82 (A. Kroeger transl. 1869).
4 II J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 790 (4th ed. 1873).
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idea was wholly Fichtean. He described and compared eight
legal relations which he called fundamental legal conceptions,
and he asserted that "these eight conceptions . . . seem to be
what may be called 'the lowest common denominators of the
law' . . to which any and all 'legal quantities' may be
reduced."5
Hohfeld's essays evoked a great deal of contemporary interest, and although analytical jurisprudence was very soon
overwhelmed by the various kinds of sociological jurisprudence,
6
Hohfeld was not refuted.
The most enduring manifestation of Hohfeldian analysis
is to be found in the Restatement of the Law of Property
where it is stated that:
The word "property" is used in this Restatement to
denote legal relations between persons with respect to a
thing. . . . Clarity of thought and exactness of expression
require the analysis and subdivision of legal relations into
types having different significances. This analysis is made
in §§ 1-4 defining respectively those legal relations designated by the words "right," "privilege," "power" and "immunity." 7
These four plus duty, no-right, liability, and disability are
Hohfeld's eight fundamental legal conceptions.
II. KOCOUREK'S PASIGRAPHY
In order to develop a jural pasigraphy in accordance with
Korzybski's thesis that the form of a language should closely
resemble the form of the subject matter, it seems proper to
adopt the Fichtean theory of the legal relation as the form
of the subject matter.
The next step is to consider the form of a legal relation.
Fichte's statement has already been noted: "a relation between
rational beings."8
Austin said, "A party has a right, when another or others

5W.

HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL

REASONING 23 (1919); Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 58-59 (1913).
Students of the Hohfeldian system will recall his claim that his
6
set of fundamental legal relations constituted 'the lowest common

denominators' of all legal discourse, by which he meant that anything that is said in other language can also be said in terms of
his fundamental legal relations .... Nobody yet seems to have dis-

covered a counter-example, i.e., a proposition expressed in other
legal language that cannot also be expressed in the Hohfeldian
language.

Address by Prof. Layman E. Allen, Proceedings of the First National
Law and Electronics Conference, 1962.
7RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note at 3-4 (1936).
8See p. 352 & note 3 supra.
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are bound or obliged by law, to do or to forbear, towards or in
regard to him."9
Holland, following Austin, analyzed and diagrammed the
elements of a right as follows:
"The series of elements into which a Right may be resolved
is therefore:
The Person
Entitled

The Object

The Act
or Forbearance

The Person
Obliged" 10

It will be noticed that the person who has the right is at
the left and the person who owes the duty is at the right and
that "the act or forbearance" (almost the very words of
Austin) is placed between the persons.
Hohfeld declined to define his eight fundamental legal conceptions because he considered them to be sui generis. 11
They are, however, defined in the first four sections of the
Restatement of the Law of Property in a way which is completely consistent with Hohfeld's analysis.
The legal relation which was called a "right" by Austin
and Holland and the Restatement was called a "claim" by
Kocourek, and he symbolized it as "A <
B" when A has a
12
claim that B act or forbear.
This symbol, one of the basic symbols in Kocourek's attempt to develop a jural pasigraphy, satisfies Korzybski's
demand that the form of a language resemble the form of the
subject matter. The two persons of the Fichtean relation are
represented as A and B. The Austinian obligation to act (to do
or to forbear) is represented by an arrow pointing left from
B, who owes the obligation, toward A, to whom it is owed.
The arrangement is the same as that in Holland's diagram.
An immediate consequence of the adoption of this nonword
symbol to represent the "right" of Fichte, Austin, Holland, and
the Restatement, as well as the "claim" of Kocourek, is that
there is no need to quibble about the name. The symbol represents the idea, whatever it may be named.
The fact that this one symbol, A <
B, may also be used
to represent the Restatement's Hohfeldian relations of duty,
privilege, and no-right probably requires explanation.
A right, as the word is used in this Restatement, is a
9 1 J. AUsTIN, supra note 4, at 277.
lo T. HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 77

11 W. HOHFELD, supra note 5, at 30.
12A. KocouREK, JURAL RELATIONs

(1886).

21, 51 (1927).
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legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that
13
the other shall do a given act or shall not do a given act.
The relation indicated by the word "right" may also be
stated from the point of view of the person against whom
that right exists. This person has a duty, that is, is under
a legally enforceable obligation to do or not to do an act.
The word
"duty" is used in this Restatement with this
14
meaning.
Thus, A <B means that A has a right that B act, and that
B owes A a duty to act.
A privilege, as the word is used in this Restatement,
is a legal freedom on the part of one person as against
another to do a given act or a legal freedom not to do a
given act.15
The relation indicated by the word "privilege" may also
be stated from the point of view of the person against
whom the privilege exists. From the point of view of this
other person it may be said that there is no right on his
part that the first person should not engage in the particular course of action or of nonaction in question. 16
By adding a zero above the arrow the existence of a relation
may be negated. Thus, A <-- B means that A has no right
that B act, and that B has a privilege not to act. If in the
description of a particular situation there is no need to emphasize the fact that a duty does not exist, the symbol may simply
be omitted.
Hohfeld identified four more legal relations: power, liability, immunity, and disability, and they are defined in the
Restatement.
A power, as the word is used in this Restatement, is an
ability on the part of a person to produce a change in a
given legal relation by doing or not doing a given act. 17
The relation indicated by the word "power" may also be
stated from the point of view of the person whose legal relation is thus liable to be changed. The subjection of the
second person to having his legal relation affected by the
conduct of the person having the power is a "liability" and
the word is used in this Restatement with this meaning.18
Kocourek

agreed

that

13 RETATEMENT OF PROPERTY §

14 Id., comment a at 4.

15 Id. § 2.
16 Id., comment a at 5.
17 Id. § 3.
1S Id., comment a at 6.

this

relation should

1 (1936).

be

called

a
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power, and symbolized it as A --> B, 19 indicating that in this
relation the act moves from A, who has the power, toward B,
who is subjected to the liability.
An immunity, as the word is used in this Restatement, is
a freedom on the part of one person against having a given
legal relation altered by a given act or omission to act on
the part of another person.20
The relation indicated by the word "immunity" may
also be stated from the point of view of the person with
respect to whom the immunity exists, that is, who has no
ability so to alter the given legal relation. This second person has, in this particular, a disability with regard to the
first person and the word "disability" is used in this Restatement with this meaning. 2'
Since immunity is merely the negation of power it may be
represented as A -- > B, for the sake of emphasis, or simply
omitted, as was mentioned in the discussion of privilege.
If Hohfeld was right when he said that right, duty, privilege, no-right, power, liability, immunity, and disability "seem
to be what may be called 'the lowest common denominators
of the law' . . . to which any and all 'legal quantities' may be
reduced,'22 then all "legal quantities" may be represented by
the symbols A <
B, A <- B, A -->B, and A --- >B.
If "legal quantities" were static (and this may have been
what Hohfeld had in mind) then nothing else would be required for a jural pasigraphy. However, whatever may be the
nature of a "legal quantity," a legal transaction is dynamic.
Things happen, and as a consequence thereof legal relations
are changed. In order to depict this process Kocourek invented
what might be called a syntax for a jural pasigraphy. He called
his arrangements of symbols "linear graphs of concatenation."
23
The following is an example:
(
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
A( + )BVA + B<B( + )AVB + A<
-B[
> ---

(5)
A[ + ]B
<

A

[Explanation: (1) is the power of A to make an offer to B;
(2) is the evolution of the preceding relation; (3) is the result
of the preceding evolution-power of B to accept A's offer;

(4) is the evolution of the next preceding relation; (5) is a
complex of two independent relations of B and A, respec19 A. KocouREx, supra note 12, at 21, 54.
20 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §

4 (1936).

21 Id., comment a at 8.
22

23

W. HOHFELD, supra note 5.
A. KoCOUREK, supra note 12,

at 72.
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tively as domini Round brackets indicate mesonomic relations and square brackets indicate zygnomic relations. The
sign V means evolution; the sign < is equivalent to "resulting in." Unbracketed arrows are evolved relations or jural
facts.]
The transaction begins at the left. As it develops and as
the legal relations change, the symbols change and are arranged
chronologically toward the right.
This arrangement of symbols- in a strictly chronological
sequence, rather than in a sequence of subject and predicate
-is
the most important aspect of the proposed jural pasigraphy
because it is so well suited for the depiction of a dynamic
process, and in this respect conforms to Korzybski's desideratum.
A consequence of this chronological arrangement is that
all the legal relations which exist at any one time must be
represented by a column of symbols, as are those which conclude Kocourek's example of a linear graph of concatenation.
III.

A REFInE PASIGRAPHY

The basic requirements of a jural pasigraphy have thus
been established: symbols (corresponding to the Arabic numerals of arithmetic) by which all of Hohfeld's fundamental
legal conceptions (legal relations) may be depicted; and a
syntax or scheme for their arrangement (corresponding to the
arrangement of Arabic numerals and lines for long division).
Actual use of these symbols in the analysis of the opinions
in hundreds of cases has of course led to the recognition of the
necessity for some further elaboration.
First of all, a chart should show what it is that causes an
aggregate of legal relations to change. Holland said:
[I]f the right is put in motion, phenomena of a new kind intervene. They are shifting, dynamical, and may be expressed
by the general term "Facts" under which are included, not
only the "Acts" of persons, but also the "Events" which
occur independently of volition. . . . [I]t is through the
agency of "Acts" or of "Events" that rights are created,
24
transferred, transmuted, and extinguished.
A jural pasigraphy requires, therefore, a symbol to represent an act and one to represent an event.
The Restatement's definition of a power, "an ability . . .
to produce a change in a . . . legal relation by doing or not
doing a given act, '2 5 indicates that an act is the exercise of a
24T. HOLLAND,

supra note 10, at 78.
§ 3 (1936).

25 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
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power. In his linear graph of concatenation, Kocourek called
this the "evolution of the preceding relation" and depicted
it as "A ( + ) B / A + B."'26 This could be simplified to
BN/, meaning that the power is exercised, i.e., the act is

A
done.

The other facts which Holland said would affect legal
relations were called "'events which occur independently of
volition.' ",27 Since such an event, e.g., the expiration of a period
of limitation, occurs independently of any legal relation, it is
properly represented by an entirely independent symbol. For
this purpose a vertical line has proved to be effective. It is
drawn at the proper chronological place in the diagram.
With these symbols it is possible to present an unsophisticated example of the use of a jural pasigraphy. The narrative
of the transaction is divided into the specific facts (acts and
events) of which it is composed, and these are stated in chronological sequence across the top of the page and are spaced
in such a way as to permit the symbols of the legal relations
to be coordinated with the facts of the transaction. A horizontal line continued toward the right from the symbol of a
legal relation means that the relation continues to exist.
Of course the legal consequences of any act or event depend upon the law of the time and of the place. The diagram
which will be used as an illustration is drawn in accordance
At the

The statute
A offers B
of limitaB
A
B
a promise for
of the
accepts performs does not tions runs
a promise
transaction
V A---> B
A--->B
revoke
offer a
promise for
B -- > A
a promise
reject
beginning

B -3;-A

/V

accept

B

A
perform
A-->B
perform
A - B
perform
A
B -perform
26
27

A.
T.

KoCOUPREK, supra note 12, at 72.
HOLLAND, supra note 10, at 78.
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with what is thought to be orthodox contemporary common
law, and a typical statute of limitations. When applied to the
same facts, the law of an earlier day, before the recognition
of trespass on the case in assumpsit, would have produced a
different aggregate of legal relations, as would the contemporary law of some other legal system, but in all of these
situations the pasigraphy itself would remain the same. So it
is that analyses by opposing lawyers, even though upon agreed
facts, and even though using the same jural pasigraphy, will
result in different charts because of the use of different law.
It should be repeated that this illustration is an unsophisticated example of the use of a jural pasigraphy, and additional refinements are required in order to improve its accuracy. Those refinements will now be discussed.
So far, only two kinds of legal relations have been considered, duties and powers. In the actual analysis of cases it
has been discovered to be necessary to recognize three kinds
of duties (actual, potential, and inchoate) and three kinds of
powers (actual, potential, and inchoate).
An actual duty is one which is presently breachable and
B.
presently enforceable, A <not trespass
A potential duty is one which is presently breachable, but
not presently enforceable, (A -- B). The failure of B to exerexercise care
cise care breaches his duty, but there will be no enforcement
unless and until B's negligence produces substantial harm
to A.
An inchoate duty is one which is not presently breachable
B]. There is of
and of course not presently enforceable, [A <
pay on next June 1st
course an actual duty not to repudiate this duty.
The symbol of an actual duty is simply A <- B; a potential
B); and an inchoate duty
duty is enclosed in parentheses (A <
B].
is enclosed in brackets [A <
The three kinds of powers are distinguished from each
other in the same way.
An actual power is one which is presently exercisable, and
the exercise would have a present effect upon other legal
B.
relations, A
offer
-

A potential power is one which is presently exercisable, but
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the exercise would not have a present effect upon any other
legal relation. This definition will have to be modified, but
before doing that an example of potential powers will be
described.
If it be assumed that a will does not become a will until
it has been written, signed, published, and witnessed by two
witnesses, then the exercise of the power to write a will does
not itself affect any other legal relation. Nor does the exercise
of the power to sign, nor does the exercise of the power to
publish, nor does the exercise of the power of the first person
to witness. The exercise of the power of the second person to
witness does presently affect other legal relations (for example,
there comes into existence an actual power to revoke) and it
is therefore an actual power. But before one person has witnessed it is not known which of the two will have this actual
power. When the first person witnesses, what had been a
potential power of the second person then becomes an actual
power. It might therefore be said that the power of the first
witness was an actual power because its exercise affected the
power of the second witness. This could lead to a domino
effect which would convert the whole series of powers to
write, to sign, to publish, to witness, into actual powers. In
order to preserve the utility of the concept of a potential power
it has therefore been defined as one which can be presently
exercised, but the exercise will have no present effect other
than to change an existing potential power into an actual power.
The example of the execution of a will would therefore
be diagrammed as follows:
(A --- B)%
write a will
(A B)
sign
(AB)
publish
(W B)
witness
(X
S)
B--

V

V
W --

B V/

witness
An inchoate power is one which cannot be presently exercised, and of course no legal relation can be presently affected
by its exercise:
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[A -

B].

enter upon breach of condition
In order to demonstrate the use of this method of diagramming a chart of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 28 a civil
rights case, will be presented. But before doing so, some additional symbols which have been found to be useful should
be tabulated.
I
X

to emphasize that a relation is terminated.
a duty is breached.

0

it is known that some unidentified person is involved in
the legal relation.

A is now identified as the person.

A

B IS HARMED
B)V
(A -not exercise care

IV.

Double lines show that A's act is
deemed to be the legal cause of B's
harm, which is stated in the narrative
of facts, as an event.
Physical cause deemed not to be legal
cause, as a defendant might show in
his chart, would be shown by a single
line rather than by a double line.

AN EXAMPLE-

Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.

In Mayer, the Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights
Act of 186629 was a valid exercise of congressional power
under the thirteenth amendment, that it prohibited private
racial discrimination in the sale of land, and that therefore
it was error for the district court to have dismissed a complaint in which the plaintiff sought an injunction against a
defendant who was alleged to have refused to sell him a home
solely because he was a Negro.
There are two charts of this case. One presents an analysis
in accordance with the majority opinion, the other an analysis
in accordance with that part of the dissent which argued that
the Act prohibited only state action. The narratives in both
charts are, of course, the same, and are based upon the facts
alleged in the complaint.
A.

Comment on Chart 1 -

The Majority

There were 36 states in 1865, when Congress proposed the
adoption of the thirteenth amendment. Each of the states there28

392 U.S. 409 (1968).

29 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
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upon acquired a potential power to ratify the amendment.
These are very good examples of potential powers. It will be
recalled that a potential power is one which can be presently
exercised, but its exercise will have no effect upon any other
legal relation, except, in some cases, to change some other
potential power or powers into an actual power or powers.
Because adoption requires ratification by three-quarters of the
states, 30 27 of the 36 powers must be exercised, but the first
25 will have no immediate effect. The exercise of its potential
power by the 26th state will cause the potential powers of the
remaining 10 states to become actual powers because the exercise of any one of them will, effectuate the adoption of the
amendment.
The chart begins at a time when 24 states had ratified.
Among those which had not were Alabama, North Carolina,
Georgia, and Oregon. The first column shows that each of
these states had a potential power to ratify. (The other eight
states which had not ratified are omitted because they are
accurately represented by Oregon.)
On December 2, 1865, Alabama, the 25th state, exercised
its potential power to ratify. It is shown that this ended Alabama's power, and that it had no effect upon any other legal
relation.
On December 4, 1865, North Carolina, the 26th state, exercised
its potential power to ratify, thereby changing the potential
powers of Georgia and Oregon-and the eight other states
which are not shown on the chart-to actual powers. This
change in the nature of the powers is shown by eliminating the
parentheses from the symbols, which are repeated on the horizontal lines indicating the continuance of Georgia's power to
ratify and Oregon's power to ratify.
On December 6, 1865, Georgia, the 27th state, ratified,
terminating the powers of all the remaining states because
subsequent ratification by them of an amendment which has
already become a part of the Constitution cannot have any
effect upon the legal continuum. This is shown by the short
vertical line which terminates Oregon's power. Georgia's ratification created in Congress an actual power to enact that all
citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every
state as is enjoyed by white citizens to buy land."1
art. V.
3142 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970).
30 U.S. CONST.
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On December 11, 1865, Oregon ratified. This had no effect
upon the legal continuum. Nothing on the chart is changed.
The existing relations simply continue. The same would of
course be true of subsequent ratification by other states.
Congress then enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866.32 The
exercise of this power affected the legal continuum by creating
new duties: actual duties owed by the states not to deprive a
citizen of the right to buy land,

not deprive citizen of
right to buy land
and inchoate duties owed by persons in general not to refuse
to sell land to one solely because he is Negro. At the time of
the creation of these duties in 1866 it was not known who would
be the person who would owe the duty 100 years later, nor
to whom it would be owed. Therefore the symbol includes
a circle at each end of the arrow,
[ O<--0].
not to refuse to sell land to
one solely because he is a Negro
These duties are inchoate (and therefore are within brackets)
because they could not be breached until there had been an
offer by a Negro to buy.
Sometime before 1965, Mayer Co. acquired the land in
question. This affected the continuum by creating, inter alia,
an actual duty owed to Mayer Co. by persons in general (the
circle) not to interfere with the possession of the land. This
is but one of the many relations which are usually included
in the aggregate of relations which constitute ownership. Another is the actual power of persons in general to offer to buy
the land. At the time of the creation of these powers Jones
was not identified as one of the persons who has such a power,
but when, as stated in the narrative, he made the offer, he was
then identified and a letter J is placed inside the circle.
The symbol
[0

->

0]

refuse to sell land to one
solely because he is a Negro
appears at the bottom of the first column of the chart, at the
beginning of the transaction, and has continued to exist. It has
32

Id.
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not heretofore been mentioned in the comment because it was
of no importance, but now it is. It is obvious that the persons
had to be represented by circles, and that the power was inchoate until an offer was made by a Negro. When Jones made
the offer, the power became actual (the brackets are removed
and Jones and Mayer Co. are identified as the persons who
are involved).
Jones' offer also affected the legal continuum by creating
the typical trio of actual powers: to accept; to reject; to revoke.
When Mayer Co. refused to sell to Jones solely because
he was a Negro, this was a breach of the duty under the Civil
Rights Act of 186633 as shown by the X mark. It was also an
exercise of his power to accept Jones' offer! This is shown by
the / mark following the symbol M -. > J, and is the necesaccepts offer
sary inference from the decision that Jones would be entitled
not merely to damages, but to an injunction. The powers to
reject and to revoke are thereupon ended, and there is created
an actual duty owed by Mayer Co. to Jones to convey the land.
B.

Comment on Chart 2- The Dissent
This chart of the dissenting opinion is of course very much
like Chart 1 in general appearance. The narrative is the same.
The first change comes with the enactment by Congress of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. This chart shows that the only effect
upon the continuum was the creation of actual duties owed
by the states not to deprive a citizen of the United States of
the right to buy land.
Since the Act of Congress did not create any
by persons in general, this chart shows that Jones'
created actual powers to accept, to reject, or to
that Mayer Co.'s refusal was simply a rejection
violation of any duty.

duties owed
offer merely
revoke, and
and not the

CONCLUSION

These charts have presented almost all of the symbols of
the jural pasigraphy: actual powers, potential powers, inchoate powers, actual duties, inchoate duties, acts, breaches,
continuation of relations, modification of relations, termination
of relations, relations in which the persons were identified by
the circumstances creating the relations, and relations in which
the persons were not immediately identified. The only important
a, Id.
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symbols which were not used were those of potential duties,
events, and causation.
The process of constructing the charts has demonstrated
that new insights - e.g., that Mayer's apparent refusal of Jones'
offer was really an acceptance - result from the use of pasigraphy to analyze cases.

NOTE
SURFACE DAMAGES FROM STRIP MINING
UNDER THE STOCK RAISING HOMESTEAD ACT
INTRODUCTION

T HE

United States government has responded to the
growing demand for western coal 1 by leasing some of the
coal retained under the various mineral reservation acts. 2 These
leases raise questions as to the extent of the rights of the conveyed surface as against the rights of the reserved mineral
estate. Surface owners who have been in possession for a long
period of time may find it difficult to remember that when
the land was granted the patent specifically reserved the minerals to the United States. This potential conflict will be aggravated if the coal lessee intends to strip mine the land and
by doing so destroy the surface and deprive the surface owner
of its use.
This note examines whether under the Stock Raising Homestead Act (SRHA) and similar legislation, 3 the surface owner's
remedies are limited to crop and improvement damage plus
the value of the land for grazing if strip mining is used, and
if the remedies are not so limited, to determine what courses
of action the surface owner might follow.
I.

DAMAGES

Some 33 millions of acres 4 of public land were patented to
entrymen under the SRHA. The United States reserved the
mineral interest' in these lands and the entrymen took a fee
simple interest in the surface. The SRHA provides that the
' Although the expense of transportation formerly impeded the development of these resources, the desirability of low-sulfur coal and the
growing industrial needs of the West are now increasing the demand
for western coal.
2 Act of March 3, 1909, 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1970); Desert Lands Act, 30
U.S.C. § 83 (1970); Stock Raising Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301
(1970).
3 Act of March 3, 1909, 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1970); Desert Lands Act, 30
U.S.C. § 83 (1970); Stock Raising Homestead Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301
(1970).
4 P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIc LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 520 (1968).
5 "All entries made and patents issued under the provisions of sections
291-301 of -this title shall be subject to and contain a reservation to the
United States of all coal and other minerals in the lands so entered
and patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and remove
the same .... " 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).
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mineral interest includes the right to prospect and the right
to mine under the following terms:
Any person who has acquired from the United States the coal
or other mineral deposits in any such land, or the right to mine
and remove the same, may reenter and occupy so much of the
surface thereof as may be required for all purposes reasonably
incident to the mining or removal of the coal or other minerals,
. . . upon the execution of a good and sufficient bond . . . to

secure the payment of such damages to the crops or tangible
improvements of the entryman or owner, as may be determined
and fixed in an action brought upon the bond or undertaking in
a court of competent jurisdiction against the principal and
sureties thereon ....

6

The provision specifies that, in lieu of consent by the surface
owner or previous agreement, the surface owner shall be
compensated for damage to crops and improvements with the
7
amount of damages to be determined by court adjudication.
Where both parties are attempting to determine and protect
their interests, court adjudication would seem to be the more
reasonable means of solution.
In enacting the SRHA, Congress was attempting to satisfy
the demand for free land in the West and at the same time
encourage exploration and exploitation of the nation's mineral resources.8 The Act therefore attempts to balance the interests of the surface and mineral occupants of the landY
The technological changes which have occurred in the half
century since the Act's passage have not escaped congressional
notice. The Act of June 21, 1949, states that:
[A]ny person who hereafter prospects for, mines, or removes by
strip or open pit mining methods, any minerals from any land

included in a stock raising or other homestead entry or patent,
and who had been liable under such an existing Act [SRHA
of 1916] only for damages caused thereby to the crops or improvements of the entryman or patentee, shall also be liable for
643 U.S.C. § 299 (1970).

7The terms of the mineral reservation damage provision of the Agricultural Entry Act of July 17, 1914, 30 U.S.C. § 121 (1970), are similar to
those of the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 and have been treated
by the courts as identical. Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Co., 38 Cal. App.
2d 11, 100 P.2d 528 (1940); Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 278 P.2d
798 (Wyo. 1955). For the purpose of this note, no distinction is made
and the term Stock Raising Homestead Act will be used to include the
Agricultural Entry Act, 30 U.S.C. § 121 (1970).
8 For a history of the development of American public land policy see
P. GATES, supra note 4; for a discussion of the disposal of minerals and
United States mineral reservations see 1 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL
LAW INSTITUTE, AMERICAN LAW OF MINING tit. 3 (1960, Supp. 1972).

9 For purposes of this note the lessee is treated as having the maximum
rights which the government could convey after severance of the surface estate. While it is recognized that the lease issued by the Secretary of the Interior will usually be more restrictive, the purpose here
is to determine the maximum rights of the parties.
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any damage that may be caused to the value of the land for
grazing by such prospecting for, mining, or removal of minerals.
Nothing in this section shall be considered to impair any vested
right in existence on June 21, 1949.10

Under this Act, the damages to the surface are stated in
terms of the reduction in the value of the land for grazing
in addition to the damages to crops and improvements provided by the SRHA. Because grazing is one of the least valuable uses of land, the land may have a market value far higher
than its value as grazing land. The owner who has improved
his land by using it for agriculture or industry will find his
damages limited to only a fraction of its actual market value.
Reading the two acts together, the damages recoverable
by the surface owner for injury to his estate by the strip
mining mineral owner seem to be limited to crop and improvement damage and the reduction of the value of the surface as grazing land.
II.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Examining the severed estates in a different manner discloses another possibility for the homesteader. In examining
the intent of Congress in enacting the SRHA, two questions
arise: First, did the Congress intend to reserve the right to
destroy the surface? Second, are the damages to the surface
owner limited to crops and improvements? If both these questions are answered in the negative, then what is the effect of
the 1949 Act?
A.

Reservation of the Right to Destroy

At the time the land was patented, the title passed 1 and
the entryman received a fee simple estate in the surface of
the land subject to the mineral reservation of the United
States. A patent issued for land which is part of the public
domain transfers the legal title and generally divests the land
department and the executive department of all authority and
control over the land. 12 Whatever the owner's rights were at
the time of patent, they were not thereafter subject to reduction without payment of compensation. 13 After patent, the
10 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1970) (emphasis added).
11 Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 640 (1881); Frisbie v. Whitney, 76

U.S. 187, 192-97 (1869).
12 Moore v. Robbins, 96 U.S. 530, 533 (1877); Putnam v. Ickes, 78 F.2d
223, 228, cert. denied, 296 U.S. 612 (1935).
13 Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330, 338 (1875); The Yosemite Valley Case
[Hutchings v. Low], 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77, 86-88 (1872); United States
v. Krause, 92 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. La. 1950); Ozark-Mahoning Co. v.
State, 76 N.D. 464, 37 N.W.2d 488 (1949).
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surface estate was no longer part of the public domain and
the entryman's rights in it, as with other vested property rights,
were subject to the laws of the state in which the land was
14
located.
The Supreme Court has said that:
legislative grants are to receive such construction as will carry
out the intent of Congress .

.

. To ascertain that intent we must

look to the condition of the country when the acts were passed,
as well as to the purpose declared on their face, and read all
parts of them together. 15

At the time the SRHA was passed, strip mining was virtually
unknown. The mechanical limitations on the ability to remove
overburden made strip mining impractical in most places and
therefore an infrequent practice. Thus, the Congress could not
have envisioned the total destruction of the surface of the
land and, therefore, made no provision for such a possibility.
There is no express reservation of the right to destroy the
surface contained in the mineral reservation of the SRHA
patents, and since Congress was presumably unaware of the
possibility, it is difficult to argue that such a reservation was
implied. 1 6 If the right to destroy the surface was not withheld
in the conveyance to the surface owner, that right could not
17
later be taken from the homesteader without compensation.
The words chosen by Congress in creating the reservation
indicate that the destruction of the surface was not envisioned. The reservation expressly states that the lessee may
enter upon and occupy so much of the land as is required for
14Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 517 (1839).

15 Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885).
16 The right to strip mine must be expressly stated in the lease, or the
mineral lessee does not receive the right. Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal
Co., 406 Pa. 188, 176 A.2d 400 (1962); Weaver v. Berwind-White Coal
Co., 216 Pa. 195, 65 A. 545 (1907); Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. 81
(1875). The right of the surface to be free of strip mining like the
right of the surface to subjacent support is considered an absolute
right. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 Pa. 422,72 A.2d 568 (1950). See 5
R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY

T

703 (1971, Supp. 1972).

Any argument that Congress reserved the right to destroy the
surface raises the question of what was conveyed. In Farrell v. Sayers,
129 Colo. 368, 270 P.2d 190 (1954), the court held that where the entire
surface of the land was sand and gravel, a grant of the minerals in the
land could not be interpreted as including the sand and gravel because
"it surely was not contemplated that the parties intended to nullify the
grant without some direct specification in the reservation." Id. at
372, 270 P.2d at 192. See United States v. Isbell Constr. Co., GowER FED.
SERv. (Mining) 39-1971, 4 I.B.L.A. 205 (Dec. 30, 1971). See also State
ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v. Trujillo, 82 N.M. 694, 487 P.2d 122
(1971), where a SRHA grant was held to exclude sand and gravel because its removal would make stockraising impossible.
17 Evans Fuel Co. v. Leyda, 77 Colo. 356, 360, 236 P. 1023, 1025 (1925),
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his mining operation.' 8 Even given the reading most favorable
to the grantor, the word occupy cannot normally be read to
encompass the total destruction of the surface through strip
mining.
B. Limitation on Damages
The SRHA contains no language expressly indicating that
the damages are limited to crops and improvements. A lessee
would be liable for negligent mining practices even if the
damage were to property other than crops or improvements. 19
This is not to say that strip mining is negligent, but rather to
indicate that the provisions are not exclusive and do not rule
out the possibility of recovery for damages to property other
than crops and improvements. Thus, it is arguable that damages resulting from the destruction of the land through strip
mining are not excluded by the Act and should be governed
by state law.
This expansion of damages beyond injury to crops and
improvements is more in line with what the Congress intended, i.e., protection of the surface owner.2 0 Using traditional
underground mining methods or surface oil extraction methods,
the surface owner could be expected to suffer some damage
to crops and improvements. Under common law the injury
suffered by the surface owner as a result of the conduct of
the mineral owner in reasonably removing the deposit was
not compensable. 2'1 The law viewed the severance of the estates as implying the right of the mineral owner to remove
the minerals; therefore, so long as his methods were reasonable, he was not liable for damage to the surface. If the SRHA
had not included the damage provision relating to crops and
improvements, the surface owner would not have been able
to collect damages for such injury. The need to extend the
rights of the surface owner beyond those recognized at common law results from the fact that in the ordinary severance
of the mineral estate there is a bargaining in which the sur1843 U.S.C. § 299 (1970). Cf. Note, Construction of Deeds Granting the
Right to Strip Mine, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 304, 315 (1971).
19
Kinney Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 505 (1928).
20
Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 17, 100 P.2d 528, 534
(1940).
21 In the absence of an express provision in a mineral deed or lease, the
grantee or lessee is not required to pay for damage to crops or improvements. He is liable only if he trespasses beyond the rights granted or
negligently causes such damage. Rochner v. Austral Oil Exploration
Co., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. App. 1958); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 341 P.2d
591 (Okla. 1959); Meyer v. Cox, 252 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)
(denial of rehearing).
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face owner may either provide expressly for such damages
or may increase the price of the mineral estate to compensate
for possible damages. By including the damage provision in
the Act, Congress gave the surface owner the protection he
22
would have otherwise bargained and obtained for himself.
In short, these damage provisions did not limit the damages
recoverable at common law, but rather they created new and
expanded rights not recognized at common law.
C. Effect of the Act of 1949
The 1949 Act 23 provides that any lessee who had been liable only for damages caused to crops and improvements shall
be liable for the damage caused to the value of the land for
grazing. If the previously proposed reading is given to the
mineral reservation contained in the SRHA, the additional
2 4
protection afforded in the Act of 1949 is of little significance.
Since the lessee is liable not only for crop and improvement
damage but for damage to the surface as well, the 1949 Act
does not increase the compensable damages. The 1949 Act also
states that it shall not be "considered to impair any vested
right in existence on June 21, 1949." If the surface owner was
granted, upon issue of patent, the right not to have his estate
destroyed, then reducing the liability to the value as grazing
25
land would be an impairment specifically rejected by the Act.
III.

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

Three cases have dealt with the damage provisions of
United States mineral reservations: Kinney Coastal Oil Co. v.
22

The argument may be made that the entryman did not pay much for
the land because the minerals were reserved, and therefore damage to
the surface was anticipated and was included in calculating the purchase price. The history of American land policy contradicts this
position. The price of the land was nominal because it was the policy
of the United States to make land available to settlers. Under the
Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, the price of the land was
nominal although no minerals were reserved. The purpose of the
mineral reservation in the SRHA was to make available to settlers
the surface of land known to be valuable for minerals, and thus obtain
the benefit of production from the surface of those lands.

23 30 U.S.C. § 54 (1970).
24Virtually all of the lands patented under the SRHA had gone to patent
before 1949. See P. GATES, supra note 4.
25 The results suggested here, i.e., that the entryman is entitled to compensation in the amount that the actual value of his land has been
reduced, may also be obtained by construing the word "improvements"
in the SRHA to mean the improved value of the land rather than the
cost of the improvements

themselves.

By such construction,

if the

surface owner spent $10,000 for irrigation equipment on land worth
$10,000 for grazing, and as a result the value of the land was increased
to $50,000 then the improved value would be $50,000 rather than $10,000
for grazing value plus $10,000 as the cost of the irrigation equipment,

SURFACE DAMAGES

FROM STRIP MINING

Kieffer;2 Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Co.;27 and Holbrook v.
Continental Oil Co.281 All three cases dealt with oil and gas
leases and did not consider the question of permanent destruction of the surface.
Kinney was an action by the oil and gas lessee to enjoin
the surface owner from creating a townsite on the lease area
which was then in oil and gas production. The plaintiff alleged
that construction of the townsite would impede the oil extraction operation and increase the harm caused by the operation. The question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether an equitable remedy was appropriate. The Kinney
Court decided that such an action was proper, and, discussing
damages in dictum, said:
The only compensation which he [the surface owner], rightfully may demand is, as the act of 1914 says, for "damages
caused" by the mining operations. The sentence next preceding
that in which these words occur makes it fairly plain that they
refer to damage to "crops and improvements," and the title to
the act, coupled with the reference to "crops" shows that "agricultural" improvements are the kind intended. Certainly it is
not intended to include improvements placed on the land, after
mining operations are under way, for purposes plainly incompatible with the right to proceed with those operations until the
oil and gas are exhausted. It may well be that, if the operations
are negligently conducted and damage is done thereby to the
29
surface estate, there will be liability therefor.

The idea that the damage to improvements is limited to
agricultural improvements presents a direct conflict with the
interpretation proposed in this note. In context, however,
the Court's statement that the damages are limited to crops
and agricultural improvements appears far less absolute than
the following sentence: "Certainly it is not intended to include improvements placed on the land, after mining operations are underway .
*...
-o This passage indicates that the
Court was referring specifically to the acts of the defendant
in making the improvements after mining had begun. If
this rule were not applied, the surface owner could, by his
own conduct, increase the damages recoverable from the mineral developer. Such actions are clearly distinguishable from
good faith improvement of one's property. The limitation on
the damages to crops and agricultural improvements appears
26277 U.S. 488 (1928).

38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 100 P.2d 528 (1940).
"S278 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1955).
211277 U.S. at 505 (emphasis added).
30 Id.
27
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to have been intended to lend greater weight to disapproval
of the defendant's activity, rather than to stand on its own.3"
If the limitation on damages to crops and improvements is
taken as absolute, as was done by the court in Holbrook, then
the Court contradicts itself in the last sentence of the quotation when it says that damages for negligence might be
recoverable. The phrase "until the oil and gas are exhausted"
makes it clear that the Court was considering a temporary
use of the surface by the mineral lessee after which the reserved estate would be terminated, and the surface owner
would have the use of the entire surface. The Court was not
thinking in terms of the total destruction of the surface estate
which might occur in a strip mining situation. As indicated
above the final sentence of the passage shows that the Court
did not rule out other types of damage.
In Bourdieu, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
caused various gulches and ravines on the premises to be
filled with oil and waste products from oil production both
on and off the premises. The court found that:
While congress intended, by these laws, to encourage the extraction of oil and gas from such lands and to permit the United
States to receive royalties therefrom, it also intended to protect
the homesteader in his limited right to use the surface of the
homestead. To permit said acts of respondent . . . without
granting appellant any recourse, would destroy the protection
32
to the homesteader intended by the statutes.

It is not clear whether the court was referring to the dumping
of waste in general or whether its reference is only to the
waste from oil produced off the premises. If the latter view
is taken, then the case is important only for its clear recognition of congressional intent to protect the homesteader. If
the disposal of waste produced on the premises is seen as
damage beyond the scope of "reasonably incident to mining"
then the court recognized compensable injury beyond damage
to "crops and improvements."
The Holbrook case was an action for damages brought by
the surface owner for injury caused by defendant's constructing houses, a tank battery, and reservoir on his land, and polluting streams and destroying natural grasses. The trial court
In Kinney, the defendant received title to his land in October 1923, and
in January 1924 platted the same 40 acres which were involved in the
oil lease as a townsite. Out of 320 acres which he received, the defendant chose two 40-acre parcels to plat as townsites, and these corresponded exactly with the plaintiff's two 40-acre leases.
32 Bourdieu v. Seaboard Oil Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 17, 100 P.2d 528, 534
(1940) (emphasis added).
31

1973

SURFACE DAMAGES FROM STRIP MINING

found as a matter of fact that the houses, tank battery, and
reservoir were reasonably incident to the oil operation and
that no water had been polluted. The Wyoming Supreme Court
found evidence in the record to support these findings 33 and
went on to discuss liability under the SRHA. But since no
damage to nonagricultural improvements was involved, the
court was not faced with that question. The court in Holbrook
based its strong language limiting damage to crops and agricultural improvements on the dictum of Kinney discussed
supra.
Thus, the three cases which have dealt with the liability
under the damage provision of the SRHA and similar provisions of other acts have not come to grips with the problem
of permanent destruction of the surface. Although the attitude
presented by Kinney and Holbrook is not sympathetic to the
surface owner, neither of the cases decided the question of
damages: Kinney was faced with a question of whether a
mineral lessee could obtain equitable relief, and Holbrook had
only to find supporting evidence to uphold the trial court's
finding of fact. All three cases recognize that the statute does
not deprive the surface owner of his common law right to
recover for damage caused by negligent mining.3 4 Although
Kinney and Bourdieu explicitly mention that Congress intended
to protect the homesteader's enjoyment of his estate, neither
case defines the extent of that protection.
IV.

INJUNCTION

If the mineral owner does not have the right to strip
mine and by doing so destroy the surface estate, may he be
enjoined from such activity? In United States v. Polino,35 the
government found itself on the other side of the strip mining
situation. In that case the defendant had conveyed land to
the United States and reserved the mineral estate. The land
was purchased for use as a forest, and the court found that
under West Virginia law the mineral reservation did not include the right to make the land useless for the purpose for
which the government obtained it. If the same reasoning were
applied to the mineral reservation of the SRHA, it would
appear that the surface owner could enjoin strip mining.
33 Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 278 P.2d 798 (Wyo. 1955).
34 Kinney Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 505 (1928); Bourdieu
v. Seaboard Oil Co., 38 Cal. App. 2d 11, 17, 100 P.2d 528, 534 (1940);
Holbrook v. Continental Oil Co., 278 P.2d 798, 804 (Wyo. 1955).
35 131 F. Supp. 772 (N.D.W. Va. 1955).
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A mineral owner who does not own the right to destroy
the surface is trespassing if he attempts to exercise that right.
Under Colorado law "[t]aking or destroying real property is
6
always regarded as irreparable injury,' '3 giving rise to an injunction. In such cases, the injury need not have occurred but
38
must be probable or threatened. 37 In Barker v. Mintz, however, the Colorado Supreme Court denied injunctive relief. In
Barker, a seam of coal was so located that its removal could
not be accomplished without the destruction of the surface.
The trial court had granted an injunction and the supreme
court in reversing said:
Every case depends somewhat upon its own facts. And here it
seems to us as inequitable to give a judgment against the defendant which destroys his property, as it would be to let him
take out his coal without compensation to the plaintiff, and so
destroy hers. Is her property more sacred then his? No injunction should be granted contrary to the "real justice of the
case." . ..The land is wild and its present value, except for the
coal, is only for pasturage, a very little of it for cultivation. The
stripping destroys these values, but the fair and equitable way
is so to treat the matter that each party will get the greatest
amount of good with the least possible harm, and that is by
allowing the defendant to take out his coal and pay the plaintiff
for the damage he thereby does to her estate. He will then get
the full value of his property and she will get the full value
of hers.3 9

The statement that every case must be decided on its own
facts raises the possibility that a Barker-type holding may be
avoided by the use of several possible distinctions. In Barker
the coal could not be removed without damage to the surface.
A court could refuse to extend this idea to a case where underground mining is possible. In the Barker situation the mineral owner would lose his entire estate while in the latter
situation the mineral owner would suffer reduced profits.
The injunction was refused on the basis of the equities
involved, and therefore in a case where the land was used for
something other than pasturage a court might distinguish the
situation. If the value of the surface is greater than the value
of the minerals an injunction should not be necessary because
the damages would make mining unprofitable. Where, however, the values involved are not purely economic, e.g., if
several hundred homes would be destroyed with consequential dislocation of families, a court might find the equities less
36 Kane v. Porter, 77 Colo. 257, 258, 235 P. 561 (1925).
37 Rogers v. Nevada Canal Co., 60 Colo. 59, 151 P. 923 (1915).
38 73 Colo. 262, 215 P. 534 (1923).
39 Id. at 266, 215 P. at 535.
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balanced.
CONCLUSION

Under the SRHA the surface owner received a fee simple
estate subject to the mineral reservation to the United States.
The United States did not retain the right to destroy the surface, and therefore that right is not available to a lessee of
the United States. If the surface of the land is destroyed by
the lessee, the surface owner is entitled to damages in the
amount of the reduction of the land's value.40 In Colorado the
right of the surface owner to obtain an injunction to prevent
strip mining is not clear, and depends upon his ability to distinguish the facts of Barker.
Thomas A. Hine

4

0 If a mineral lessee paid a bonus for the right to mine coal under the
impression that he would have the right to strip mine, and the value
of his right is materially reduced because of an increase in the amount
of damages he must pay or because of greater expense in removing the
coal by some other method, his remedy would be against the government on his contract. If the Department of Interior were under a
similar impression when leasing, it would seem that mutual mistake
would permit rescission.

COMMENT
WATER LAW - ACT OF GOD

DEFENSE -

FLOOD DAMAGE

FfOm REsERVOiR OvEnow - Barr v. Game, Fish &
Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).

T

HE Colorado Game, Fish and Parks Commission had almost
completed construction of a dam and spillway on Clay
Creek when, in June of 1965, heavy rains fell over the Clay
Creek drainage basin resulting in a flood of unprecedented
magnitude.' The Commission, in their design and construction
of the dam and reservoir, left a ridge on one side of the reservoir basin at a lower elevation than the dam crest.2 A combination of this dam height and a limited spillway capacity 3 caused
the flood waters to overflow the low point in the ridge. The
result was considerable damage to the property of numerous
plaintiffs situated below the ridge. In a suit by these plaintiffs,
judgment was entered against the Commission.
On appeal, the defendant Commission argued that the flood
was of such magnitude that it was an act of God, and therefore
no liability could be attached to the incident. The Colorado
Court of Appeals refused to accept this argument on the
grounds that the evidence was sufficient to show that defendant's engineers could have foreseen a flood of this magnitude by use of the maximum probable flood technique. As foreseeability precludes the act of God defense, the defendant Commission was held liable under Colorado's absolute liability
statute 4 for damages resulting from overflow from a reservoir.5
Initially, the opinion of the court appears to adhere to the
accepted precedent that proven foreseeability of a given occurrence will preclude the act of God defense. 6 However, the court
I The peak flow at the reservoir site was 158,000 cubic feet of water per
second of time (c.f.s.). The previous high flow of water in Clay Creek
was 27,500 c.f.s. Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340,
342 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972).

2 The dam crest elevation was 3,670 feet above sea level. The low point
in the ridge was at 3,666 feet above sea level. Id.
3 The plans indicated that the spillway was designed to discharge a flow

of 33,000 c.f.s. The spillway as built, however, would discharge only

4,500 c.f.s. Id.
4 "The owners of the reservoirs shall be liable for all damages arising
from leakage or overflow of the waters therefrom or floods caused by
breaking of the embankments of such reservoirs." COLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 148-5-4 (1963).

5 Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Comm'n, 497 P.2d 340 (Colo. Ct. App.
1972).
6 See Annot.,

169 A.L.R. 517, 534 (1947).

WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 336 (1961).
381

See generally Comment, 18
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in Barr has created a standard of foreseeability based on what
the reasonable engineer should have foreseen tested by the
engineering technique of maximum probable flood prediction.
This comment will compare the novelty of this test to earlier
Colorado case law and examine the potentially serious ambiguities created by this change in the law.
I. COLORADO PRECEDENT
The Colorado precedent on the act of God defense and its
application under the statute of liability for reservoir overflow
is fragmented and sparse. Prior to Barr, the Colorado courts
were never forced to consider the multi-faceted aspects of the
problem in any one case. It is possible, however, through a
conjunctive analysis of this precedent to discover the basis for
the court's holding in Barr.
In an early construction of the overflow statute, the Colorado Supreme Court, in Garnet Ditch & Reservoir Co. v. Sampson,7 held that the statute placed an absolute liability upon the
reservoir owner for damage caused by' seepage, overflow, or
flood resulting from dam failure, and therefore reasonable care
and foresight by the owner does not excuse liability. Although
the act of God defense was not in issue since there was no
storm or flood upon which to base it, the court indirectly
addressed the problem by stating that "unless an exception
appears in the statute we must presume that none was
intended . . . .,,1
The court directly faced the availability of the act of God
defense in an action brought under the overflow statute in
Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz.9 Contrary to the dicta in
Garnet, the court held that an act of God or the common
enemy is a good defense under the statute. Although the sufficiency of proof of act of God was not in issue, the court commented that the uncontroverted evidence of the defendants
was sufficient to prove that the rainstorm could not have been
foreseen and therefore could be designated an act of God.' 0
This comment by the court implies that if an occurrence is
foreseeable it is not an act of God.
This interpretation of Ryan is reinforced by Greeley Irrigation Co. v. Von Trotha1 ' where the court considered the issue
7 48 Colo. 285, 110 P. 79 (1910).

8 Id. at 289, 110 P. at 80. Justice Campbell, in a dissenting opinion, felt
that act of God must be an exception to the absolute liability imposed
by the statute. Id. at 297, 110 P. at 1136.
• 77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925).
10 Id. at 68, 234 P. at 1062.
1148 Colo. 12, 108 P. 985 (1910).
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of an act of God defense in a case not involving the overflow
statute. The court approved an instruction on the question of
what constitutes an extraordinary flood: that through the
"exercise of reasonable foresight and prudence the natural consequences of such a flood could not be foreseen and guarded
'12
against.
In sum, the Colorado standard on act of God, as evidenced
by Ryan and Greeley Irrigation,is reasonable and prudent foreseeability. Any occurrence which is reasonably foreseeable
does not constitute an act of God. The evidence in both cases
further indicates that foreseeability will be tested by a direct
13
comparison with prior occurrences.
II. Barr v. Game, Fish and Parks Commission
Barr specifically reaffirms the holding in Ryan by acknowledging that the act of God defense is available under the
statute of liability for overflow from a reservoir.1 4 But, probably because of the scarcity of Colorado precedent and the lack
of a direct ruling upon what specifically constitutes an act of
God, the court turned to Nebraska for its definition of the
defense.
A.

Act of God-

Standard

The Barr court states:
In Baum v. County of Scott's Bluff, 172 Neb. 225, 109 N.W.
2d 295 [1961], the court defined an act of God as follows: "In
order for a flood to come within the term act of God, it must
have been so unusual and extraordinary a manifestation of
nature as could not under normal conditions have been reasonably anticipated or expected. . . An act of God does not
necessarily mean an operation of natural forces so violent and
unexpected that no human foresight or skill could possibly
have prevented its effect. It is enough that the flooding should
be such as human foresight could not be reasonably expected to
anticipate and whether it comes within this description is ordinarily a question of fact."' 5

This definition appears to differ from the Colorado rule derived from Ryan and Greeley Irrigation since the standard of
reasonable foreseeability is not tied to prior occurrences. The
Baum court held that the test is whether a reasonable man,
at 22, 108 P. at 988.
13 In Greeley Irrigation the evidence was that the "extraordinary flood"
was one of the largest which had occurred in the vicinity. Id. at 12, 108
P. at 985. In Ryan the evidence was of an unusual and unprecedented
flood resulting from a clcudburst. Ryan Gulch Reservoir Co. v. Swartz,
77 Colo. 60, 234 P. 1059 (1925).
14 497 P.2d at 343.
15 Id. (emphasis added by the Colorado Court of Appeals).
12Id.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 50

exercising reasonable human foresight, could have foreseen an
occurrence of the magnitude which actually occurred. The
facts in Baum, however, belie this conclusion. The evidentiary
question, which was held to be of sufficient weight to submit
the issue to the jury, was whether or not the storm which occurred was greater than recorded prior occurrence.16
The test applied by Nebraska courts to the foreseeability
of any particular occurrence is clarified by an examination of
the precedent upon which Baum relied. The definition of act
of God was taken from Cover v. Platte Valley Public Power
& Irrigation District1 7 where the Nebraska court presumed that
if rainfall of a larger than ordinary amount has occurred in
the past, it will occur again. Cover, in turn, relied on Webb
8
v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District1
where it
was stated that "[t]he evidence is that it was not an unprecedented rain; that many other similar rains had occurred
in the vicinity; and that defendant . . . could reasonably have
anticipated that such rains would happen again."'19
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Baum standard
of reasonable foreseeability is in application tested by comparison with prior occurrence. Thus, the court in Barr, by
adopting the definition of act of God from Nebraska, simply
clarified the existing law implied in the Colorado cases of
Ryan and Greeley Irrigation. In application, the rules of both
states on act of God are essentially the same: an occurrence
which can be reasonably foreseen, tested by comparison with
prior occurrence, is not an act of God. The importance of Barr,
however, rests with the changes it makes in the standard of
foreseeability and the unique test which the court applies.
B.

Test - Maximum Probable Flood
The Barr court modifies the basic act of God rule by redefining the reasonable man and foreseeability. Relying on
Ryan and Baum, the court holds that a flood greater than
recorded prior occurrence, but reasonably foreseeable by an
engineer (as opposed to a reasonable man) is a foreseeable
flood, thereby precluding the act of God defense. Furthermore,
such an expert must "foresee" through the engineering technique of maximum probable flood prediction, a test based
upon prior occurrence. In the technique, that "prior occur16 172 Neb. 225, 235, 109 N.W.2d 295, 302 (1961).
17 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956).
18 146 Neb. 61, 18 N.W.2d 563 (1945).
19 Id. at 70, 18 N.W.2d at 568.
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rence" is one which occurred in a meteorologically similar
area, not necessarily the same basin, and through a process
of transposition and factoring for such variables as soil moisture and antecedent conditions, the resultant predicted flood
is of greater magnitude than any previous occurrence in the
20
basin.
The court, therefore, has made two modifications in the
existing law; substituting an engineer for the reasonable man
and applying a test based upon prior occurrence rather than the
prior occurrence itself. What are the ramifications of these
changes by the Barr court?
III.

THE EFFECT OF

Barr ON

SMALL DAM

BUILDERS

AND OWNERS

The definition of act of God adopted by Barr includes the
phrase " 'so unusual and extraordinary a manifestation of nature
as could not under normal conditions have been reasonably
anticipated or expected.' ",21 The definition of "normal conditions" is a key element of what a reasonable person should
foresee. The court applies the maximum probable flood prediction technique to this aspect of the problem. However,
according to hydrologists, the flood discharges predicted by
use of the technique "represent flood discharges that may be
expected from the most severe combination of critical meteorologic and hydrologic conditions that are reasonably possible in
the region. ' --2 Certainly a layman cannot be expected to con20 The storm transposition method of maximum probable flood prediction
involves the transposing of a storm which actually occurred in a hydrometeorologically similar area over the basin in question. The storm is
then oriented over the basin to obtain maximum reasonable fit of the
storm to the basin. Factors such as ground elevation and dew point
are then applied to obtain release of maximum moisture content. The
precipitation which results is then factored by values for such variables
as infiltration characteristics and maximum reasonable antecedent soil
moisture in order to obtain the predicted runoff of the maximum
probable flood. See BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR,
DESIGN OF SMALL DAMS 19-61 (1960).
The predicted probable maximum flood is always greater than
recorded prior occurrence because the method is a maximizing process
of recorded prior occurrence. In the Texas gulf coast area, a hurricane
region, predicted probable maximum values approach equality with
recorded prior occurrence. In the experience of the engineering firm
whose experts are quoted by the Barr court, the probable maximum
flood has never been less than 1.05 times larger than recorded prior
occurrence and that was in the Texas gulf coast area. In the Colorado
plains region the average relationship is a probable maximum flood of
1.33 to 5 times larger than recorded prior occurrence. Interview with
William W. Wheeler, Jr., W.W. Wheeler & Associates, Inc., in Englewood, Colorado, Oct. 11, 1972.
21 497 P.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
(emphasis
22 V. CHOW, HANDBOOK OF APPLIED HYDROLOGY § 25-26 (1964)
added). As a matter of fact the storm transposition method approved
by the court in Barr is "the greatest maximizing process for a given
basin . . . ." Id.

§ 9-63.
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sider as "normal" the conditions involved in this technique.
Thus the court has created a much higher requirement of foreseeability by equating normal conditions with those severe
conditions presumed in the technique.
This redefinition places a heavy burden on the average
small dam owner. Possibly in response to this, the court has
complemented this higher level of foreseeability by holding
that "if the flow of water which occurred in the Clay Creek
basin was reasonably foreseeable by defendant's engineers, then
it may not be designated an act of God. ' 23 Presumably an
engineer would have the capability to use the technique and
understand what the court means by "normal conditions." But
does this substitution of an engineer for the reasonable man in
Barr mean that everyone planning a dam and reservoir of
whatever size needs an engineer's analysis? If not, to whom
does this holding apply?
According to expert opinion, the engineering design technique of maximum probable flood analysis is "confined to the
determination of spillway requirements for high dams [such
as that found in Barr], but in unusual cases [the maximum
probable flood] may constitute the design flood for local protection works where an exceptionally high degree of protection is advisable and economically obtainable." 24 In contrast,
Barr and the absolute liability statute involved, apply to all
reservoir dams in Colorado. 25 This expansion of the technique
to all reservoir dams is unfortunate not only because it contradicts the engineering standards enunciated above, but also because it overlooks the fact that practicing engineers do not
always use the maximum probable flood technique in the design
of all reservoir dams. When engineers design small dams they
normally use criteria similar to those set forth by the Bureau
of Reclamation:
23497 P.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
24

25

V. CHow, supra note 22, § 25-26.

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 148-5-13 (1963) provides:
None of the provisions of sections 145-5-5 to 148-5-14 shall be

construed as relieving the owners of any such reservoir from
the payment of such damages as may be caused by the breaking of the embankments thereof, but in the event of any such
reservoir overflowing, or the embankments, dams or outlets
breaking or washing out, the owners thereof shall be liable for
all damage occasioned thereby.

The sections mentioned above refer to small dams which do not require
the State Engineer's approval for construction, and owners who do not
comply with the State Engineer's inspection and instructions for maintenance. Barr and the absolute liability statute probably do not apply

to the extremely small reservoir known as livestock water tanks which
are covered in COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-17-1 to -16 (1963).
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to property
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but

loss of human life is not envisioned.
(3)

Failure

would

cause

Then
(1) Inflow design flood is
equivalent to the maximum
probable flood.
(2)

Irflow design flood may

be as much less than maximum probable as that obtained by assumption A.
(3)

Inflow design flood may

only loss of structure with

be as much less than maxi-

little damage to property
and project operation.

mum probable as that ob26
tained by assumption B.

Following these guidelines an engineer would use a design
flood of lesser magnitude in two of the three situations.
Thus, because a layman lacks the training and expertise to
use the maximum probable flood technique, a strict interpretation of Barr requires him to consult an engineer in the design
of a dam and reservoir of any size. The engineer is then
forced to abandon his normal design criteria and apply the
maximum probable flood technique regardless of the size of
the structure or the potential damage if the structure should
fail. Engineering services are expensive and the design and
construction costs of a small structure capable of handling a
flood of such large magnitude can be grossly disproportionate
to the benefits derived from the structure itself. The resultant
economic impact upon the layman owner-builder is such that
many small dams and reservoirs could not be built solely
because of the effect of Barr.
The court can avoid placing this economic burden on the
small reservoir owner-builder by limiting this decision to the
facts of the case, i.e., large structures. Because of the definition of act of God adopted from Baum, the standard in situations involving small structures could be a reasonable man
exercising reasonable human foresight to be tested by prior
occurrences. However, until the court so limits the holding of
Barr, it is incumbent upon the lawyer advising any reservoir
26 BUREAu

OF

RECLAMATION,

U.S. DEPT. OF

INTERIOR,

DESIGN

OF

SMALL

DAMS 43 (1960). Assumption A involves the reduction by a statistical
factor of the precipitation predicted for probable maximum and then
application of that reduced precipitation to probable maximum antecedent soil conditions. Under assumption B the reduced precipitation
of assumption A is applied to antecedent soil conditions of less than
probable maximum magnitude. Id.
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Task Force on
Spillway Design Floods adopted similar criteria for when to use a design
flood of lesser magnitude than maximum probable. 90 ASCE JOURNAL
OF

HYDRAULICS DIVISION 296-98

Flood is usually 40 to 60%
note 22, § 25-26.

(1964).

A Standard Project Design

of maximum probable. V. CHOW, supra
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owner or builder to emphasize the gamble involved in not
obtaining an engineer to design the structure to handle a
maximum probable flood.
IV. CONCLUSION

The defendant in Barr contended "that the trial court
abolished the defense of act of God by holding that damages
occasioned by this flood were not an act of God. '27 If the case
is strictly interpreted to hold that a maximum probable flood
is the test of the foreseeability of a design engineer as to
whether the defense is available, the defendant's contention
is well-founded. A maximum probable flood is of such magnitude that, except in areas such as "hurricane alleys," the
chances of an occurrence closely approaching' maximum probable are remote. That being the case, the act of God defense is
seldom if ever available under such an interpretation of Barr.
The court could have avoided the problems and burdens
created by this decision. The central problem in such cases is
who should bear the cost of damage caused by the overflow
from a reservoir. Since the absolute liability statute is established law, it is suggested that justice would be better served
if the statute were strictly applied without exceptions, resulting in a single issue of proximate cause. The court would then
have to answer only one question: would the damage which
occurred have occurred if the subject dam and reservoir were
not there? If the answer is yes, the defendant is not liable.
If the answer is no, the defendant is totally liable. If the
answer is that only a proportionate amount is attributable to
the existence of the dam, the defendant is liable for only that
proportionate amount.
The result in Barr is the same as it would be under the
above proximate cause analysis; but because of the ambiguities and differing potential applications of the case, whether
the results under different fact situations would be as commendable is not clear.
Kendall T. Sanford

27

497 P.2d at 342.

